

MORE SHADOW THAN LIGHT

**Violence and Security in Colombia:
One Year into Duque's Administration**

2020

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
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Table of Contents

Introduction	7
Violence and Security in Colombia: One Year into Duque's Administration	10
Security Dynamics: The National Panorama	23
Post-FARC Armed Groups (GAPF): The Threat has Consolidated	26
The Gulf Clan: The Advances and Setbacks of Paramilitarism's Heirs	34
The Strengthening of the ELN and the Difficulties Facing a Return to the Path of a Negotiated Exit	39
Political Violence during Duque's Administration: Three Sides of the Same Coin	47
Regional Electoral Violence	48
Selective Assassination of Social Leaders	63
What about the Physical Security of FARC-EP Ex-Combatants and their Families?	63
The PNIS's Breaking Point: Taking Stock of the Program One Year later	72
References	85

More Shadow Than Light

**Violence and Security in Colombia:
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Introduction

The Peace and Reconciliation Foundation (Fundación Paz y Reconciliación) deployed a team of around 50 people throughout the country to conduct an investigation aimed at shedding light on the security situation in Colombia. The objective was three-fold. First, to account for Iván Duque's first year in office by analyzing security advances and setbacks and evaluating the Defense and Security Policy (Política de Defensa y Seguridad), which was launched at the beginning of the year. This objective was particularly urgent given that improved security was one of Duque's central campaign promises.

Second, to understand the current state of territorial security nearly three years after the Peace Accord was signed at the Colón Theatre. Academics working in the field of post-conflict studies divide this transitional period into two phases. The first, known as the Stabilization Phase, spans the first three years following the signing of the Accord. It is a period when it is important to control security indicators in post-conflict zones, prevent the emergence of illegal armed organizations that aim to take over territory, and, above all, it is a period when the State should begin to make its presence felt in regions previously administered by the demobilized armed group. After this period, and for the next seven years, comes the Normalization Phase, which refers to the Reconciliation period and, in general, to national transformations which promote peace.

In theory, the Stabilization Phase is about to end; for this reason, it is important to take stock of the behavior of security indicators and the state of the ELN, Organized Armed Groups and post-FARC or dissident groups in order

to determine the future of various regions of the country. It is also necessary to analyze the situation of social leaders, human rights defenders and FARC ex-combatants as well as assess the dynamics of political violence as they occurred during this past election year.

Additionally, there was a third objective, which was to clarify the debate. For instance, in an interview with CNN, Senator Álvaro Uribe said there were more than 5,000 FARC dissidents and that ELN membership could reach 15,000. These numbers seem absurd, but nevertheless require investigation to confirm or deny them. Also, in many parts of the country, social organizations have affirmed the reemergence of paramilitary groups; another assertion which required investigation. It was therefore necessary to clarify the state of security in the country.

Based on these three objectives, the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation examined security in Colombia. Eight (8) facets were analyzed.

- a. Data on violence associated with the armed conflict. National data, as well as that of the municipalities prioritized by the Foundation, were analyzed.
- b. The state of post-FARC and dissident groups.
- c. The state of the ELN: their presence, armed activities and evolution over the past three years.
- d. The state of Organized Armed Groups, particularly the Gulf Clan (Clan del Golfo).
- e. The victimization of social leaders and human rights defenders.
- f. The victimization of FARC ex-combatants and a general analysis of the reintegration policy.
- g. Electoral political violence within the context of local elections which took place this past October.
- h. The state of the Comprehensive National Crop Substitution Plan (Plan Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos).

For each facet, different conclusions are presented. However, to make the report easier to read, we present nine (9) overarching conclusions:

1. Of the 281 municipalities which the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation prioritized for the post-conflict, there are 123 where the FARC-EP previously operated and which have since been taken over by illegal armed groups and criminal organizations.

In other words, there are more than 150 municipalities where the post-conflict won and the period of political violence has ended. In fact, within these 123 municipalities, there are several where the incidence of take-over is actually low; with action by the Armed Forces along with other state institutions, security could rapidly be regained. With things as they now stand, of the 123 occupied municipalities, 107 of these present significant security problems.

2. Post-conflict zones can be divided into four types according to degree of criminal take-over:
 - There was a group of zones where criminal take-over occurred adjacent to the FARC-EP reintegration camps. The Pacific coast as well as the Bajo Cauca and Catatumbo regions are good examples of this.
 - There were other zones where take-overs occurred, on average, 18 months after the FARC-EP left. Putumayo and some areas of Caquetá and Vichada exemplify this. There, owing to the reluctance of drug traffickers to enter areas previously held by the FARC-EP, the price of cocaine paste fell drastically between 2017 and the first semester of 2018. Generally, those who did enter these zones to buy base paste did so accompanied by former guerrilla members. During these 18 months, the state remained absent and take-overs occurred in the second semester of 2018.
 - There were zones vacated by the FARC-EP that were not later occupied by the state or any criminal group. There, insecurity indices, such as robbery, highway robbery and cattle theft, shot up. However, there was no

significant criminal infrastructure present; the perpetrators were mostly common delinquents. Southern Tolima and some areas of Valle del Cauca and Huila are good examples of this.

- There were other zones where the State did make its presence felt. This occurred mainly in the capitals of these municipalities.
3. The peace process had an impressive impact on a number of violence indicators associated with armed conflict which showed substantial reductions. The returns on peace are high. However, at this point, nearly three years after the Peace Accord was signed, security measures must be reinforced to prevent a new wave of violence from erupting in the country. It is not yet clear if the armed conflict that plagued the country for more than 50 years has been overcome. During the first year of Iván Duque's presidency, various violence indicators have shown positive behaviors.
 4. From 2012 till 2017, there was an incredible reduction in violence indicators. In 2018, some of these indicators rose, particularly homicide. In 2019, they have fallen yet again, returning to 2017 levels. However, this positive news brings with it a problematic diagnosis: much of this reduction is owed to pacts among various criminal organizations (as is the case in the Pacific region of Nariño), or to the emergence of a single dominant criminal group (as in Catatumbo), or to the decision of criminal actors to lay low while they regroup (as in Putumayo). All three of these scenarios lead to reductions in violence. In other words, levels of violence are not proportional to the presence of criminal organizations.
 5. The zones where criminal organizations and illegal armed groups are either present, consolidating their territory or engaged in territorial disputes, can be organized into five (5) territorial areas:

- The Nudo de Paramillo region, which encompasses southern Córdoba, Bajo Cauca, and north and northeast Antioquia.
- The Catatumbo region and part of the metropolitan area of Cúcuta.
- The Pacific regions of Nariño and Cauca.
- Southern Meta, Guaviare and part of Caquetá.
- The Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta.

6. The victimization of social leaders reached 292 assassinations and more than 1,000 threats. In most cases, the victimizers are individual actors (hired assassins). So far in 2019, the frequency of homicides has lowered (compared to 2018), but the number of threats has increased.

7. Electoral violence within the context of the local elections in October was truly dramatic. Between October 2018 and the beginning of August 2019, 109 threats, 15 attacks and 13 homicides, among other victimizations, were recorded. The fact that the areas with the greatest victimization do not coincide with the post-conflict zones is striking.

8. The political sectors most affected by political violence are the opposition and the government coalition; in other words, those political sectors that are growing. Meanwhile, traditional political parties have low rates of victimization.

9. The assassination and victimization of FARC-EP ex-combatants in various parts of the country is troubling. Over 100 ex-combatants have been murdered, along with dozens of their family members. The Peace and Reconciliation Foundation has three hypotheses about these murders.



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
One year has passed since Iván Duque Márquez assumed the presidency. One of his biggest campaign promises was to normalize the country's security situation. According to the then-candidate and his Democratic Center (Centro Democrático) party, the Final Peace Accord was responsible for a mismanagement of national security as well as a demoralization in the Armed Forces resulting from the Accord's soft approach strategy and its intention to transform the institution for the post-conflict. In fact, Duque included the reinstatement of military

honor in his campaign proposal. However, this promise has been tainted following the intense questioning he faced for appointing military officers investigated for human rights violations and international humanitarian law infractions to leadership positions within the institution. At the same time, serious scandals involving corruption and the issuance of guidelines which puts the civil population at risk (both of which have dogged him throughout the first year of his presidency) have deteriorated the image and credibility of military institutions.

National Data

Between 2012, when the public phase of negotiations between the Colombian government and the now defunct FARC-EP guerrilla army began, and 2017, the general rate of violence associated with the armed conflict decreased considerably. However, in 2018, there was a slight increase associated with disputes between illegal armed structures (EAI for their initials in Spanish) in


territories prioritized for the post-conflict. The explanations for this are the exit of the FARC-EP as an armed actor on the one hand and the inability of the Colombian state to take control of security and enforce the rule of law in these zones on the other. For example, after plummeting since 2012, the homicide rate increased by one point in 2018.



Homicidios	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Número	15727	14294	12626	11585	11532	11373	12130
Tasa	33,76209643	30,33461302	26,49082377	24,03357	23,65649683	23,07289259	24,34069

Source: The National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences (Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses). Created by: The Peace and Reconciliation Foundation


Difference in Homicide Rates between 2017 and 2018



There is a group of municipalities—either former FARC-EP territories or zones prioritized for the post-conflict—which remain trapped in spirals of violence. These include the Catatumbo region, Antioquia’s Bajo Cauca region, the Pacific coast of Nariño, southern Córdoba, northern Cauca, Putumayo, Arauca and Chocó, all of which suffer attacks from re-organized criminal groups vying for control of illegal assets. Indeed, in 2018, increased

homicide rates were recorded in municipalities with higher levels of institutional weakness, illegal markets and limited institutional capabilities. That is, the homicide rate rose in rural areas that have historically been affected by violence. In large cities and in municipalities where coca is not present, violent homicide rates continue to decrease.

National Homicide Rate vs Homicide Rates in Municipalities Affected by Coca¹



Source: The National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences (Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses). Developed by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation

¹ Data only available up till 2017; the list of municipalities affected by coca in 2018 is not yet available.


The Thirty Municipalities with the Greatest Increase in Homicide Rates, Countrywide 2017-2018

Department	Municipality	2017 Rate	2018 Rate	Variation 2017-2018
Cauca	ARGELIA	7,34726865	87,4189553	1089,815692
Antioquia	VALDIVIA	12,8573265	133,717772	940,0122575
La Guajira	BARRANCAS	2,76747661	27,1282079	880,2506646
Cauca	CAJIBÍO	2,62130069	23,4204226	793,4657021
Cauca	CORINTO	12,2297979	90,6152777	640,9384722
Caquetá	LA MONTANITA	16,6930974	120,13256	619,6541011
Antioquia	COCORNA	6,69120107	46,9043152	600,9849906
Huila	ALGECIRAS	4,06322376	28,3837483	598,5524288
Antioquia	DON MATÍAS	4,30867336	29,5246531	585,2376735
Sucre	SAN MARCOS	5,12802981	32,074548	525,4750691
Caquetá	EL PAUJIL	9,60061444	56,7429544	491,0346132
Antioquia	NECHÍ	3,58230342	20,9900297	485,9366801
Nariño	MAGÜÍ	4,18953454	24,3803332	481,9341731
Nariño	MALLAMA	13,385089	68,1942171	409,4789962
Cauca	PATÍA	21,6831549	110,188395	408,1751055
Santander	SAN GIL	2,1856968	10,8953825	398,4855418
Cundinamarca	CHÍA	1,50726123	7,36637398	388,7257646
Cauca	BALBOA	7,69082869	34,3380389	346,480351
Córdoba	CERETÉ	7,52372661	33,0797221	339,6720382
Antioquia	TARAZÁ	57,6714061	233,044904	304,0909008
Nariño	LA UNIÓN	3,89271673	15,696739	303,2335282
Tolima	MARIQUITA	11,9976005	47,9645063	299,7841597
Meta	PUERTO RICO	10,6422604	42,3953365	298,3677795
Tolima	PURIFICACIÓN	3,38535495	13,4839036	298,3010281
Cundinamarca	VILLETA	3,93995508	15,6881202	298,1801781
Huila	SANTA MARÍA	8,65351333	34,3465568	296,9088099
Caldas	MARMATO	10,8530497	43,0570506	296,7276642
Cauca	SOTARÁ	5,78938227	22,9673863	296,7156638
Arauca	ARAUQUITA	18,9703825	75,1526538	296,1578206
Córdoba	CHINÚ	2,02584984	8,02552116	296,1557754

Source: The National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences (Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses). Developed by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation

For their part, in 2018, large cities like Medellín, Bucaramanga, Cali, Barranquilla and Bogotá represented 28% of all homicides nationwide; the 281 municipalities at risk of post-conflict


violence and prioritized by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation represented 30%; the rest of the country 42%.



Source: The National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences (Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses). Created by: The Peace and Reconciliation Foundation

During the first year of Duque's term, the national homicide rate decreased slightly, continuing the trend set in previous years (with the exception of 2017 and 2018, depending on the variable analyzed). As the following graph illustrates, homicide rates

have not varied significantly from one month to the next (except for December 2018, which saw a spike culminating in 1,178 homicides, making it the most violent month of the past two years).




Source: The National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences (Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses). Developed by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation

The bar chart below compares homicidal violence rates between January and September from 2017 to 2019. Note the reduction between 2018 and 2019 and the similarity in 2017 and

2019 totals. In other words, the country is currently experiencing a moment of fragile stabilization at a homicide rate of 24 for every one hundred thousand residents.


Homicides between January and September 2017, 2018, 2019




Source: The National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences (Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses).

In the 281 municipalities prioritized for the post-conflict, homicide rates are growing. The already tough reality of these territories—those most affected by the war—has been made even tougher because of homicidal

and political violence (the latter owing to the recent elections), including assassinations of social leaders and FARC-EP ex-combatants (see political violence chapter).



Source: The National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences (Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses).




Source: The National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences (Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses). Developed by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation

Between January and September 2019, there were 178 fewer homicides than in the same period the previous year. One explanation for this based on the economics of violence is the temporary accords reached between previously warring groups. This is the case of the Gulf Clan and the ELN in Chocó and is especially true of the pact made last December between the Guerrillas Unidas del

Pacífico and the Óliver Sinisterra Front in the municipality of Tumaco.

Another explanation is territorial consolidation through armed confrontation, as the ELN achieved against the so-called “Pelusos” in the Catatumbo region. This victory led to a localized decrease in homicidal violence and displacement.


Homicides in the 281 Municipalities Prioritized for the Post-Conflict. January-September 2018-2019



Source: The National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences (Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses). Developed by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation

Although 2019 saw pacts made between illegal armed structures that led to a decrease in homicidal violence, confrontations resulting from criminal restructuring through the end of 2018 produced casualties in such numbers that many territories have yet to experience the benefits of peace reflected in the global post-conflict statistics.


Another indicator following a promising trend is forced displacement. Though 2018 saw a slight increase compared to previous years, over the long term, rates have decreased, even in comparison to 2013 and 2014, as can be observed in the following graph:



Source: National Victims Registry (Registro Único de Víctimas).
Developed by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation. Date retrieved: November 22, 2019.
* 2019 figures include up to September 30th.

As illustrated in the previous graph, the 2019 figures are below those of 2018, reflecting the consolidation of the reduction of indicators in 2019. Similarly, the number of victims of anti-personnel mines and unexploded ordnance dropped between 2012 and 2017. However,

in 2018, these cases tripled compared to 2017, despite institutional humanitarian demining efforts—born of the agreement between the FARC-EP and the Colombian government—carried out in different territories in the country.




Source: Office for Comprehensive Action Against Anti-Personnel Mines (Dirección para la Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal, DAICMA). Developed by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation]
* Data from 2019 comprises the period from January 1 to October 31.

Comparing the period between January and October of the years 2017, 2018 and 2019, a considerable increase in anti-personnel mines and unexploded ordnance victims is

apparent in 2018, a pattern mirrored in most of the variables analyzed. The most affected areas are Catatumbo, the Bajo Cauca region of Antioquia, Cauca and Nariño.


Victims of Anti-Personnel Mines and UXO January-October 2017, 2018, 2019



Source: Office for Comprehensive Action Against Anti-Personnel Mines (Dirección para la Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal, DAICMA). Developed by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation


With respect to forced disappearance—a grave violation of multiple human rights—the country has experienced a downward trend; however, in 2017, the annual total rose to 6,828, a number which fell off slightly the following year. In 2019, the current trend suggests that the annual total will be somewhat less than in 2018, as is seen in the forced displacement graph.

However, the data from the Legal Medicine Institute did not discriminate among types of forced disappearance and therefore included cases not associated with the armed conflict. The figures show constant violations of human rights that even today, after the signing of the Final Peace Accord, affect the population and also illustrate the government’s inability to adequately confront this problem.




Source: The National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences (Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses). Developed by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation

Analyzing the data from the Victims Registry, which records forced disappearance associated with the armed conflict, the incredible impact of the peace process becomes apparent. Below are the data available up to August 1, 2019.




Source: National Victims Registry (Registro Único de Víctimas).
 Created by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation. Date retrieved: August 22, 2019.
 * 2019 figures include up to August 1st.

The involvement of children and adolescents in armed groups, a type of violence especially—though not exclusively—associated with insurgent groups, has decreased gradually between 2012 and 2018. The figures reflect a radical decrease through October 2019.




Source: National Victims Registry (Registro Único de Víctimas). Developed by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation.
 * 2019 figures comprise the period between January 1 and October 31st.

Kidnapping, another type of violence typical of the Colombian war context, has been in consistent decline since 2012. This trend represents one of the most important results of the peace process, along with declines in the involvement of children and adolescents in armed conflict. Below are the figures.



Source: National Police. Created by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation.


Comparing the development of kidnapping indicator is on the decline, as is illustrated in the statistics between January and May of the last three years, it is apparent that in 2019, this following graph.



Source: National Police. Developed by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation.

This represents some of the best news to come out of the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation's research, considering how at the end of the 90's and beginning of the aughts, the country averaged more than 3,000 cases of kidnapping per year. The current trend suggests that in 2019 there will be around 100 cases; in other words, kidnapping is about to disappear.

The last violence indicator associated with the armed conflict to be analyzed was violence against members of the Armed Forces in the line of duty. To put it simply, the decline was incredible. Below are the data from the Defense Ministry. Of around 3,000 members affected in 2013 between those dead and wounded, the number of incidents fell to less than 1,000 in 2018 and, if the trend continues, 2019 will close at around 900.



Source: National Ministry of Defense. Developed by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation.

Beyond this landscape of generalized violence both nationwide and in the 281 municipalities prioritized for the post-conflict, the peace process effectively brought about reductions in all indicators of violence associated with the armed conflict. Nevertheless, in some municipalities—principally those located in areas with illegal economies—security problems persist.

Likewise, between 2012 (the year negotiations began) and 2016 (the year they concluded), violence indicators associated with the armed conflict decreased sharply. In 2017, the

downward trend continued, though at the end of the year they began to increase in some areas of the country (a result of take-overs and subsequent territorial disputes by criminal organizations and illegal armed groups). In 2018, owing to these disputes, some indicators began to rise. In 2019 they fell again, this time due either to one criminal organization emerging the definitive victor of a territorial dispute or to pacts formed between competing criminal organizations.

Iván Duque's Security Policy and the Difficult Situation of the Armed Forces

Iván Duque Márquez's administration's Defense and Security Policy: For Legality, Enterprise and Equality (Política de Defensa y Seguridad, PDS for its initials in Spanish), launched at the beginning of 2019, identifies the principal security threats facing the country internally and externally. At the external level, it identifies Venezuela as an explicit threat owing to its political instability; it also identifies other potential threats beyond the southern hemisphere that may aim to interfere in the country. At the internal level, it identifies criminal groups and illegal economies as constituting the principal risks to the country's security.

In this sense, some of the strategies planned for confronting these threats are:

- The division of the country into three classes of zones: One such class is the Strategic Zones for Comprehensive Intervention (Zonas Estratégicas de Intervención Integral, ZEII for its initials in Spanish). These are territories relevant to national security which are defined by the National Security Council (Consejo de Seguridad Nacional) as having the purpose of: "...protecting the population and ensuring unified, coordinated, inter-agency, sustained and comprehensive action by the State." It is important to emphasize that this designation takes into account the special protections that water, biodiversity and the environment must receive. Other aspects considered are: the substitution of illicit economies for legal ones, the strengthening and promotion of conflict resolution methods, the creation of a Comprehensive Environmental Protection Agency and the implementation of Territorial Development Programs

(Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial, PDET for its initials in Spanish). A fundamental aspect of this policy is the previous Consolidation Plan from Uribe's administration, with a few adjustments.

- The substitution of illicit economies for legal ones: Here, a series of coordinated actions are proposed that would see the ZEII working in conjunction with the PDET, Action Plans for Rural Transformation (Planes de Acción para la Transformación Rural, PATR for its initials in Spanish), substitution plans and plans for alternative development. The policy also alludes to strengthening the justice system and intensifying the war against organized crime.
- The creation of a comprehensive policy for the war against drugs: This involves strengthening strategic actions by the Armed Forces to deactivate different markets associated with drug processing; the design and creation of the Strategic Center for Monitoring the Comprehensive Policy against Drugs; and attacks on cash flows that originate in illegal activity.
- Waging of war against asset laundering and criminal financing: This involves the creation of the Coordination Center against Finances from Organizations Involved in Transnational Crime and Terrorism, whose purpose is to monitor the flow of illegal capital and propose alternatives to dismantle it; and the strengthening of government prevention, pursuit and sanctions to staunch the flow of illegal capital.

- Protection for at-risk individuals and communities: This involves strengthening prevention and protection measures, particularly for victims, social leaders and human rights defenders. Its objectives are to improve the response to the Early Warning System (Sistema de Alertas Tempranas, SAT for its initials in Spanish), strengthen judicial and law enforcement capabilities for the capture or neutralization gang leaders, and reduce the average waiting period to receive protective measures from the National Protection Unit (Unidad Nacional de Protección, UNP for its Spanish initials). The incorporation of a differentiated focus on Comprehensive Security and Citizen Coexistence Plans, with special emphasis on the protection of LGBTI people, is also proposed.
- Legal protection and well-being for members of the Armed Forces. This entails strengthening and rendering more independent the military's criminal justice system along with improving technical and specialized defense capabilities for existent cases. In other words, it proposes recourse to the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, JEP for its Spanish initials).
- Civic Participation Network: A civic participation network will be driven by a "living" network for the flow of information between authorities and civilians.

Although this policy contains some generic elements of international agendas—the multidimensional vision it evinces that includes security, the environment and cyberspace as well as and the inclusion of differentiated focuses for civilian security and the protection of leaders in particular are evidence of this influence—other aspects suggest a setback in matters of security. For example, even after peace was signed with the FARC-EP (which, broadly speaking, signaled the beginning of the post-conflict phase), the policy made no allusion either to this fact nor to the challenges associated with it, such as the need to restructure the defense sector in response to new security challenges. In other words, it does not consider the need for changes to military strategy in order to address transformations in criminality; therefore, it will be difficult for this policy to become a tool for the transformation of territorial realities.

Note, for instance, how the government promised quick action and immediate results following the January 17th ELN attack on the Escuela General Santander in Bogotá. Nevertheless, by the end of August, no definitive attack on the guerrilla army had occurred. Likewise, at the territorial level, the Armed Forces were unable to end the war between the Gulf Clan and the Caparrapos, a conflict which left hundreds of people displaced or dead and emptied entire villages. The intensity of the violence only began to diminish when, in mid-August, both criminal organizations made a pact to divide the territory.

Another relevant aspect of this policy is its omission of security advances achieved during Juan Manuel Santos's presidency. While Duque's administration's policy is interesting in its diagnosis and comprehensiveness, its strategy contains many elements that are outdated or suggestive of political revenge. For example, it makes no reference to Law 1448 of 2011—the Victims' Law, passed during Santos's first term—which recognizes the Colombian war as an Internal Armed Conflict, thereby promoting a more nuanced understanding of

the complexities of the country's violence and taking distance from the position of a "terrorist" threat championed by Santos's predecessor. In his second term, Santos's security policy also integrated aspects of peace building, attention to victims, transitions to peace and robust coordination with the justice system.


Furthermore, there are irrefutable similarities between Duque's first year in office and Uribe's two terms. Civic participation networks, for example, have a direct antecedent in the Informants Network laid out in Uribe's Democratic Security Policy. This network aspired to turn citizens into law enforcement allies through economic incentives given in exchange for information that led to guerrilla groups. However, this policy had the effect of involving civil society in the war, making civilians targets of violence from both armed groups and the Armed Forces. At the same time, it created stigma in communities and civil society organizations and instrumentalized "the social needs of distinct sectors" through rewards for accusations individuals and entire communities that supposedly belonged to so-called "terrorist support networks."

Duque's security policy resumes some of the errors made by the Uribe administrations and ignores Santos's successes. The institutional language of reconciliation, peace building, victims, reparations and post-conflict have disappeared, while stabilization and consolidation have taken center stage.

Due in part to the errors implicit in creating a regressive and anachronistic security policy, the Armed Forces have been in the eye of the hurricane since Duque took office. There have been corruption scandals, aggressive questioning of military leadership regarding extrajudicial executions carried out during Álvaro Uribe's presidency, and the issuance of regulations which allow for more "flexibility," to say the least, in the precision of military operations against organized armed groups.

It is not the first time the public has learned of irregularities in the Armed Forces, but on this occasion, the debate has reached a higher level and the President, Defense Minister Guillermo Botero (who resigned under pressure from congress members and public opinion), and military leadership have been called upon to give explanations and order the creation of a special mission to revise certain aspects of military directives and actions.

The willingness of certain segments of the Armed Forces to vent publicly about corruption and declare their fear of an institution that, as they see it, is engaged in human rights and international humanitarian law violations is, without a doubt, another of the the Peace Accord's contributions. Today, many officials have the courage to criticize the institution and break with the military's esprit de corps in the name of rescuing the institution's honor; the press feels greater liberty to amplify these voices; and there is less fear of arming the enemy—and so harming the military—in the midst of high-intensity confrontations with the guerrilla.

The background of the image is a sunset or sunrise scene. The sun is a bright, glowing orb in the upper center, partially obscured by a thin layer of clouds. The sky is filled with soft, golden light that fades into a darker, hazy horizon. In the foreground, there are dark, silhouetted hills and trees, creating a sense of depth and atmosphere. A large, white, thin-lined circle is centered on the page, framing the text.

Security Dynamics: The National Panorama

After the FARC-EP abandoned their zones of operation—a total of 242 municipalities—a power vacuum formed. In these zones, one of three things happened.

1. Between D-Day² in December 2016 when implementation of the Peace Accord began and mid-2017, a window of opportunity opened. Many areas remained in limbo and even drug traffickers stopped buying cocaine paste from growers since they could no longer count on the security the FARC-EP had once provided. In regions such as BAJO Putumayo, the window of opportunity lasted 18 months; during this time, the price of cocaine paste fell sharply to nearly 900 pesos per gram. However, during these 18 months, the state remained absent. In July 2018, the process of criminal take-over began.
2. In other areas of the country where the FARC-EP had operated, criminals quickly took over. After three or four months of structural consolidation, criminal organizations and illegal armed groups either arose or arrived in these areas. The Pacific region of Nariño is a good example: Post-FARC groups or dissidents, organized armed groups and the ELN took over territories previously occupied by the FARC-EP.
3. In other municipalities, though the government did not make its presence felt after the FARC-EP left, violent structures did not take root. Although criminal phenomena emerged—bands of thieves and common delinquency which, in some cases, increased certain security indicators—the truth is that in these areas, there was no large-scale take-over by significant criminal organizations.
4. That said, below we refer to the zones which did experience criminal take-overs and where the homicidal violence indicator rose substantially.

Five common elements emerge to explain, at least in part, the emergence of new waves of violence in five regions where the government has been unable to guarantee its citizens' security. These regions are experiencing a violent post-conflict period. They are: the Pacific coast from southern Chocó to Tumaco; Norte del Cauca; Nudo de Paramillo; Catatumbo and the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta.

- (i) The destabilization of local powers following the FARC-EP's transition to legality after the signing of the Final Accord.
- (ii) The government's inability to accomplish even the most basic state-building activities in these territories: namely, establishing monopolies of force, administration and justice, and guaranteeing basic services.
- (iii) The emergence and proliferation of new illegal armed structures.
- (iv) The failure of preliminary talks with the ELN and the failure of attempts to bring the Gulf Clan (AGC) to justice.
- (v) The creation of post-FARC groups which, though they initially arose from the desire of a few individuals to continue their involvement in illegal activities, have since become more common as the government fails to fully implement the Final Accord.

Before the Final Accord was signed, there were indications that Colombia faced an especially high risk of experiencing a violent post-conflict period³, given that the illicit economies which had motivated and sustained the country's wars remained robust. For this reason it was necessary for the government to launch an emergency security and local development plan that would reduce the risk of other illegal armed structures (EAI for its initials in Spanish) emerging or arriving to occupy the vacuums created by the FARC-EP's exit.

2 In Colombia, D-Day refers to December 1, 2016 which marks the formal beginning of the FARC-EP's withdrawal to the Transitional Local Zones for Normalization (TLZN) and therefore the beginning of the end of the organization as a guerrilla group.
 3 Risk Index for a Violent Post-Conflict Period. Available at: https://fundacionpazyreconci-my.sharepoint.com/personal/andres_narvaez_pares_com_co/Documents/303711361-Informe-Lo-Que-Hemos-Ganado.pdf

The risk of post-conflict violence did not stem exclusively from the ex-guerrilla's transition to legality. In each of these regions, there are underlying issues of structural violence that have not been resolved and which generated previous waves of violence. Thus, although some factors present in the current context have contributed to increases in violence, other structural and historical factors associated with the production and reproduction of violence continue unresolved:


- (i) Illegal land grabbing by local legal elites who employ violent methods of removal and then appeal to judicial mechanisms to legalize the theft.
- (ii) Violations of and limitations to the right to political participation of groups and leaders.
- (iii) Competition for illegal revenues by armed structures and illegal elites such as drug traffickers or those involved in criminal mining.
- (iv) The recruitment or creation of illegal armed structures by legal and illegal elites to increase or secure their economic or political capital.
- (v) Local powers in collusion with illegal armed actors.
- (vi) Power vacuums created by the institutional inability to achieve a monopoly on violence, justice administration and the provision of basic services (obligations established by the Constitution of 1991).

In 2019, nearly three years after the signing of the Final Accord, the Stabilization Phase⁴ of the post-conflict is nearly over. With the government unable to fulfill the objectives necessary to transition to the Normalization Phase⁵ (Pares, 2018), illegal armed structures have continued to expand and grow stronger. Below, we present the current state of the principle illegal armed structures present in the national territory, namely the Gulf Clan, ELN and Post-FARC Armed Groups.

4 Post-conflict theory divides this transition stage into two general periods. The first is Stabilization and stretches the first 36 months after the signing of a peace accord. During this phase, the State has three objectives: 1. reduce indicators of violence; 2. avoid the resurgence of new waves of terror and break the cycle of illegality that has immersed the local population via the provision of basic services; and 3. guarantee conditions for territorial and social development (Pares, 2018).

5 After Stabilization comes what is known as Normalization, a phrase with three objectives: 1. create stable middle-term plans to consolidate the state of law and remove criminal actors and illegal economies; 2. the Transitional Justice model ought to begin to show results and the right to the guarantee of No Repetition should also be consolidated; and 3. implementation of institutional actions that mitigate the structural causes of violence (Pares, 2018).

Post-FARC Armed Groups (GAPF): The Threat is Consolidated



During the first year of President Duque's administration, multiple armed groups mostly comprised of ex-guerrillas from the FARC-EP have grown stronger. In October 2018, Post-FARC Armed Groups were reported in 58 municipalities; by mid-August 2019, their presence had expanded to 27 additional municipalities, bringing their total number to 85. In the Colombian Pacific, for instance, Post-FARC Armed Groups (GAPF, for their initials in Spanish) known as Guerrillas Unidas del Pacífico, the Óliver Sinisterra Front and Gente de Orden have expanded into rural and urban areas, stretching from the municipality of Tumaco northward along the coast to Buenaventura. These three structures composed of the defunct 29th and Daniel Aldana Fronts, which operated in the Colombian Pacific, have also recruited new members through economic incentives which, given the government's inability to guarantee employment alternatives to youth in these territories, often represent the only local means of securing an income.

In the Pacific, the presence of these three structures is not uniform. Though Gente de Orden has arrived in Buenaventura, it does not have a strong presence in the Pacific region of Cauca. The Óliver Sinisterra Front has extended through the regions of Telembí and Cordillera as well as the entire Pacific region of Nariño and is present in Guapi. The Guerrillas Unidas del Pacífico have extended through the Pacific region of Nariño and have also managed to arrive in northern Cauca, where they are engaged in disputes over the control of the Naya River corridor.

There are GAPF originating in the 30th Front present along the Pacific coast between Cauca and Chocó and passing through the Naya region in the Norte del Cauca. This group absorbed other small structures that had formed in these municipalities, the most

relevant being the Jaime Martínez Mobile Column. In the department of Cauca, another three Post-FARC groups which originated in the defunct 6th Front, Carlos Patiño Front, and the Miller Perdomo, Dagoberto Ramos, Jaime Martínez and Jacobo Arenas mobile columns, are found.

The GAPF Jaime Martínez Mobile Column, commanded by alias "Mayimbú," the 30th Front GAPF and the Guerrillas Unidas del Pacífico are present in the municipalities of Buenos Aires y Suárez, where they dispute control over the Naya. The 6th Front has managed to extend through the remaining municipalities of this subregion: in Jambaló, Caldoño and Toribío it has not encountered other structures, but in the "Golden Marijuana Triangle" (comprising the municipalities of Miranda, Corinto and Caloto) the EPL, the José María Becerra Front of the ELN and other local armed structures financed by drug traffickers are all fighting for control.

The Carlos Patiño Front GAPF is present in El Tambo, Balboa, Patía and Argelia, the municipalities which have been most affected by coca cultivation. According to sources present in the territory, its current territorial dispute is with the José María Becerra Front of the ELN and other illegal armed structures present in the territory which are financed by Mexican drug cartels.

Recently, the Dagoberto Ramos Mobile Column appeared in Silvia, Caloto, Corinto, Toribío, Jambaló and Inzá. On August 14, 2019, the Armed Forces identified the heads of some of the Post-FARC Armed Groups operating in the department of Cauca, with rewards offered for their capture.

GAPFs have also consolidated their presence in the Nudo de Paramillo subregion which includes municipalities in southern Córdoba and the Bajo Cauca region in Antioquia. On rewards posters, the Armed Forces have identified Tarazá, Cáceres, Valdivia, Puerto Libertador and Tierralta as municipalities with the presence of GAPF originating in the defunct 18th, 36th and 58th Fronts. At the same time, the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation's research has identified GAPF in the municipalities of Caucaasia and El Bagre, in Bajo Cauca in Antioquia, and also in Montelíbano and San José de Uré in southern Córdoba. In this subregion, violence has increased owing to the dispute between the Caparrapos and Gulf Clan, with the GAPF allied with the Caparrapos.

For its part, in northern and northeastern Antioquia, GAPF originating in the defunct 36th and 18th Fronts are present in the municipalities of Yarumal, Briceño and Ituango. Their influence reaches as far as Urabá and is especially strong in the municipality of Dabeiba.

In the Catatumbo region, the GAPF born of the defunct 33rd Front has consolidated its presence in the municipalities of San Calixto, Tibú, Teorama and Convención. Since the beginning of 2019, this GAPF has been allied with the ELN, an alliance which, according to local sources, has as its origin an agreement made between both groups before the Final Accord was signed. According to this agreement, the FARC's 33rd Front handed over a series of routes, contacts and territories to the ELN under the condition that, in the event that the 33rd Front recidivated, the ELN would return these assets. As a matter of fact, while the ELN and EPL were in direct

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Alias "El Indio"
Cabecilla
Columna móvil Dagoberto Ramos



Gerardo Ignacio Herrera Pavi
Alias "Barbas"
Tercer Cabecilla
Columna móvil Dagoberto Ramos



Leyder Johany Noscue
Alias "Mayimbu"
Cabecilla
Columna móvil Jaime Martínez

Influencia : Caloto, Corinto, Miranda, Toribio, Jámbalo e Inzá.

HASTA \$ 20.000.000 MILLONES



Eduar Alejandro García
Alias "Javier"
Segundo Cabecilla
Columna móvil Dagoberto Ramos



Luis Carlos Caines UI
Alias "Luisca"
Cabecilla comisión
CMDR

Influencia : Caloto, Corinto, Miranda, Toribio, Jámbalo e Inzá.

HASTA \$ 10.000.000 MILLONES



Jonier Eridés Valencia
Alias "Gato"
Cabecilla comisión
CMDR



Miguel Virgilio Orozco
Alias "Canoso"
Integrante
CMDR



Juan Camilo Rodas
Alias "Carepalo"
Integrante
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Oswaldo Gamaliel
Alias "Gamaliel"
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confrontation, this Post-FARC group was looking to stabilize and grow, an objective which, at the moment, it seems to have achieved.

The department of Arauca's complex security situation is further complicated by the regrouping of ex-guerrillas from the defunct 10th, 28th and 45th Fronts of the FARC-EP, which now seek to position themselves through the so-called Martín Villa 10th Structure. They are present in the municipalities of Saravena, Tame, Fortul, Arauquita and especially along the Arauca border area in veredas⁶ such as

⁶ Translator's Note: In Colombia, a vereda refers to a territorial subdivision within a municipality. A vereda does not have a nucleus per se in the way villages or towns do but they may be comprised of various different villages, as in this case.


Puerto Colombia, Selvas del Lipa, Matal de Flor Amarillo, Los Caballos, Mate e ´ Piña, Maporita and Feliciano, which form part of the village of El Caracol, where ex-guerrillas likely receive supplies and arms from the Puerto Infante Estado Apure area of Venezuela (Ombudsman’s Office (Defensoría del Pueblo), 2019).

In the Guaviare department, the most relevant illegal armed structures continue to be the GAPF born of the 1st, 7th and 40th Fronts and a few residual groups from the 62nd Front of southern Meta. Both the 1st and the 7th Fronts have been commanded by Gentil Duarte, one of the FARC-EP’s delegates to the peace talks in Havana, who himself took up the thesis that the Peace Accord only aimed to demobilize the guerrilla, not affect real change, and who is using the Colombian government’s consistent failure to fulfill the


objectives of the Peace Accord to justify a lack of confidence in the State.

As a matter of fact, the Post-FARC or dissident structures that operate in 85 municipalities are grouped into 23 structures and number about 1,800 ex-guerrillas among their ranks as well as nearly 300 new recruits. During the first year of Duque’s administration, these structures expanded vastly, increasing their presence from 58 to 85 municipalities. Yet this growth occurred largely under the radar as these groups avoid confrontation while they grow and consolidate their command. In fact, in some zones, their growth has been truncated by a lack of officers to structure the new organization.

With things as they now stand, these Post-FARC groups face three possible paths:



The Gulf Clan: The Advances and Setbacks of Paramilitarism's Heirs



The Gulf Clan, or Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC, for its initials in Spanish), could well be considered the organized armed group (GAO for its initials in Spanish) with greatest reach at the national level. Owing as much to the group's extensive presence in different regions of the country as to its approximately 2,500 members—as well as an indefinite number of associates who provide territorial support—it stands to reason that this criminal structure represents the strongest heir to paramilitarism in the country today.

Currently, the Gulf Clan has achieved consolidation in areas that were previously disputed with other illegal armed structures. The extent of their territory has varied as they have taken over new areas and—according to information gathered in their territories—as they have negotiated pacts with other violent actors with whom had been in conflict in some regions of the country. This is the case of an alleged pact formed with Caparrapos in Nudo de Paramillo, where both groups were previously engaged in open war. Additionally, in accordance with its transnational character, this group continues establishing and diversifying networks of allies with organizations at different levels (local and international) to achieve economic returns from the different illegal enterprises they manage or participate in.

The Gulf Clan is present in 276 municipalities where they simultaneously combine and deploy four action and consolidation strategies, depending on the particular characteristics of the territory, the actors with whom they dispute territorial control, the benefits they hope to gain and their ability to operate directly without resorting to allies or subcontracted third parties. Accordingly, it can be said that the Gulf Clan, in line with the conclusions reached by previous Peace and Reconciliation

Foundation reports, typically resorts to the following strategies:

a) The sale of franchises: In some territories, as will be seen later in this report, the Gulf Clan has not expanded through the deployment of armed contingents sent to engage in open and direct confrontation. Rather, they have opted to sell the possibility of territorial control to groups operating on a smaller scale. This is the case, for example, of the Bajo Cauca region of Antioquia and Norte de Santander (with the La Línea group).

b) Open armed confrontation: In other territories, the Gulf Clan resorts to open armed conflict to maintain territorial control, as is the case of some municipalities in Valle del Cauca and Chocó.

c) Economic persuasion: The Clan recruits young people (in particular) by offering salaries of between COP \$1,200,000 and \$1,800,000, a tactic which facilitates their management of common delinquency, strengthens their manpower and assures their territorial consolidation.

d) Selective violence: by means of different forms of violence, both lethal and nonlethal, the Gulf Clan has resorted to threats against, attacks on and assassinations of social leaders, political candidates and public service officers in different parts of the country. This permits them to infect terror in residents and organizational processes⁷ This in spite of the group's consistent denials that they practice or promote violence against civilians. In many acts of violence against social leaders, the Gulf Clan and other criminal structures act on behalf of businesspeople and local politicians who feel affected by the legitimate actions of social organizations.

⁷ In the information system SIPARES, at least 45 acts against leaders allegedly perpetrated by the Gulf Clan were registered on August 12, 2019.

Since the end of 2018, the Gulf Clan's leadership has suffered various blows. These include the capture of "El Indio" at the end of 2018; alias "Navarro" in April 2019; alias "Palillo," brother of Otoniel (the Gulf Clan's top leader) and himself a leader in the group; alias "Guillermo," one of Otoniel's cousins; and more recently, alias "Piquiña," who supposedly commanded the Pablo José Montalvo Cuitiva structure which was in charge of the group's operations in Chocó.

Although it cannot be said that these arrests have halted the group's consolidation, they likely have affected their organizational and operational capabilities. In fact, various sources claim that these captures have forced Otoniel to resort to new leaders who lack the experience of their predecessors, many of whom were former members of paramilitary organizations.

Additionally, the Gulf Clan has also suffered a series of internal disputes that have escalated in different territories. This seems to have fragmented the unity of the group's leadership and its domination in some territories. This likely has also interfered with their finances and income.

Regarding this last point, it is known, for instance, that at the end of 2018, in the Bajo Cauca region of Antioquia (one of the Gulf Clan's major areas of influence), alias "Cristian," former high commander of the Francisco Morales Peñate Front, separated from the group and as a result of this schism, carried out various violent acts aimed at "cleansing" the region of the Gulf Clan's influence. Within the context of these confrontations, 2018 ended with an uptick in assassinations, especially in the municipality of El Bagre in Antioquia, the base of

operations of alias "Cristian." Thus, while in July the municipality recorded 3 homicides and none in August, 31 of the 46 homicides recorded over the entire year occurred in the last four months of 2018.

In December 2018, the group under the command of alias "Cristian" formed an alliance with Los Caparrapos (also a former ally of the Clan) with whom the group had waged a bloody war for control of the Nudo de Paramillo since 2017. Likewise, different sources indicate that this violent schism has extended to Tarazá, Cáceres, Nechí and Zaragoza.

Added to these breaks with former members—of which alias Cristian is only the most recent example—the Armed Forces⁸ have dealt the group several blows, and in the regions where the group has achieved its widest presence, there is no shortage of conflicts with other armed actors: in Chocó, particularly in the municipalities in the San Juan River watershed (Istmina, Tadó, Condoto and Unión Panamericana) a dispute with the ELN has been ongoing since at least March of 2017. In 2018, in the Nudo de Paramillo, clashed with the Post-FARC Armed Group (GAPF) commanded by "Cabuyo" (of the defunct 36th Front of the FARC-EP) in Ituango and other municipalities of Bajo Cauca were added to the war with the Caparrapos. That year, a triple alliance between the ELN (Caparrapos-ELN-36th Front) was formed to assault the Clan in one of its areas of greatest influence⁹. Likewise, in Santa Marta, a war between Los Pachencia, another of the Clan's former associates, is active, and in Buenaventura, they have engaged in clashes with La Empresa and the ELN.

8 Although the Armed Forces's strategy has replicated a security model that has proved ineffective, large scale operations have been deployed in the regions where the Gulf Clan has influence which have affected the group's structure. This is the case, for example, of the Agamenón I and II operations in the Bajo Cauca region of Antioquia and Urabá.

9 The latest testimonies collected in the territory indicate that Otoniel has temporally moved his base of operations from the Urabá region to Nudo de Paramillo in order to strengthen his command capabilities there.

However, despite these disputes with different armed structures in various regions of the country, numerous take-downs and captures of important members of the structure, and failed alliances that do not cease to cost them, the group is far from being debilitated.

a. On the one hand, according to sources consulted by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation, it seems that a new non-aggression pact has been reached in Nudo de Paramillo with the Caparrapos that would leave the Gulf Clan in charge of crop production and management in southern Córdoba, while the Caparrapos would manage the transportation and export for the same territory. At the same time, the Clan would have sole control over the coastal region of Córdoba, while in Bajo Cauca in Antioquia the Caparrapos would take charge of distribution. This has led to a substantial reduction in homicides in the subregion.

b. Additionally, in Buenaventura, the killing spree has not pressured the Gulf Clan at all; rather, it has strengthened it. The ongoing war with La Empresa and the ELN has brought new territories under its control and this, coupled with its strong ties to drug trafficking organizations, has made the Clan the hegemonic armed actor in this city in Valle del Cauca. This was especially the case after November 2018, when the group won control of Boroughs (comunas) 9 and 12, and the support of the group known as “La Banda” has strengthened its dominion in the boroughs under that group’s control (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and some neighborhoods within Boroughs 11 and 12). This, in spite of the fact that the Gulf Clan has lost power in some neighborhoods in Boroughs 3.

c. Similarly, in the Urabá region (the Gulf Clan’s original bastion), the group has fortified its military capabilities, especially in Bajo Atrato, in the Darién region and in the Avive mountains. In these areas, which are part of a strategy to guarantee international drug trafficking routes, it is also known that the Gulf Clan has strengthened its “political and social” activities, promoting health brigades, constructing aqueducts and opening highways. In this expansion process, it has also been moving into southern Chocó.

c. Likewise, recent denouncements made by human rights defense organizations¹⁰ point to the Clan’s expansion into southern Cauca (into the municipalities of Balboa and Argelia), where it is likely looking to consolidate the group in its search for routes to the Pacific. This, in addition to its presence in Nariño (especially in the department’s Pacific region) where it appears to have resumed alliances with the Oliver Sinisterra GAPF¹¹, would make the Clan a nearly transversal presence along the Pacific coast of Colombia.

The Gulf Clan’s current state shows that military deployment is just one of the criminal organization’s modes of operation. This group acts by adapting to each area’s territorial features, allowing the organization to maximize its income from the different illegal enterprises they manage or seek to manage. Judging from its use of small gangs to control extortion and micro-trafficking and its disputes over control of different businesses apart from its principle activity of drug trafficking, such as illegal mining, it seems clear that this group is accustomed to utilizing whatever strategies allow it to, above all, strengthen its criminal economic prowess.

10 <https://pares.com.co/2019/08/10/el-paramilitarismo-esta-de-regreso-en-el-sur-del-cauca/>

11 <https://lasillavacia.com/el-clan-del-golfo-esta-golpeado-pero-creciendo-70338>


The Urabá region reflects this situation. There, supported by the strategy championed by their commander in chief, Otoniel, the Gulf Clan seeks to give a political character to the organization, supplying social needs, broadcasting announcements and forming ties with communities. This, in spite of ample evidence that shows the group prefers to use violence to consolidate and gain territorial control.

The Gulf Clan’s formula of “a rey muerto, rey puesto” (“dead king, new king”), which they apply when replacing leaders and allies, combined with its organizational flexibility and military capabilities, has allowed the group to remain intact despite internal and external attacks and to turn these clashes into advantages in their expansion and consolidation endeavors in strategic areas of the country.

To date, since the signing of the Peace Accord, the Gulf Clan has expanded to 26 municipalities:

Department	Municipality
Antioquia	Anorí
Antioquia	Ituango
Antioquia	Vigía del Fuerte
Antioquia	Peque
Antioquia	Urrao
Antioquia	Amalfi
Atlántico	Galapa
Bolívar	Montecristo
Bolívar	Calamar
Caldas	Marmato
Caldas	Supía
Cauca	Santander de Quilichao
Cauca	Argelia
Cauca	Balboa
Cauca	Buenos Aires
Chocó	Alto Baudó
Chocó	Riosucio
Chocó	Carmen del Darién
Chocó	Murindó
Chocó	Belén de Bajirá
Chocó	Medio San Juan
Chocó	Tadó
Chocó	Unión Panamericana
Chocó	Juradó
Chocó	Medio Baudó
Meta	Puerto Rico

The Strengthening of the ELN and the Difficulties Facing a Return to the Path of a Negotiated Exit



Two incidents have shaped the ELN's current state and its action repertoire in 2019. The first and most important is the Duque administration's suspension of preliminary peace talks (Mesa de Conversaciones) at the beginning of the year following the bloody guerrilla attack on the General Santander Cadets School (Escuela de Cadetes General Santander). The second is the direction this guerrilla group has taken since the government's decision to renege on the logistical protocols that should have come into effect following the breakdown of talks, and which has left two leaders, alias "Gabino," the

guerrilla Commander in Chief, and alias "Pablo Beltrán," trapped in Cuba while they await a decision to be made regarding their return.

In the background, is the sudden change in the ELN's territorial strategy. In spite of the efforts of Duque's administration to deal blows to this illegal armed group, the results are practically null. Operational changes the group has made explain why. For example, the use of camps is no longer as common, guerrilla soldiers no longer use uniforms and they move in small groups without heavy weaponry.

The BreakDown of Talks

Against this background, the only alternative that the State and the ELN have is to fight. This is no small challenge, given that the launch of a strategy of open confrontation by the military could have more humanitarian costs than tactical results, owing to the particular form that the ELN has adopted to maintain itself as a guerrilla army.

The ELN's war tactics imply a particular challenge to the State, as they are classic guerrilla warfare strategies. On the one hand, ELN combatants put into practice the idea of the activist-combatant: "activist by day, combatant by night." This puts the civil population at risk, as the ELN effectively seeks to camouflage itself among the rural civilian population. The Armed Forces have victimized communities on multiple occasions, in such a way that there is a high probability of crimes against international humanitarian law and human rights. On the other hand, the guerrilla army tries to avoid open engagement as they understand that the Armed Forces are the superior military force. Instead, it focuses on effecting brief but overwhelming blows (such as sharpshooter attacks, the use

of medium and high capacity explosive devices, harrying and ambushes).

Additionally, the ELN does not organize into large groups but rather into small, specialized cells, limiting their exposure. It will take the State time to identify the presence of and attack the ELN, though this could be achieved in a matter of months. What is clear is that heightened violence is not required to decimate this guerrilla group. The time of bombing campaigns is behind us and change requires a strategy based on military intelligence and captures in order to bring down the ELN.

But the ELN will not have an easy time resisting a resolute military assault either. The atmosphere of peace generated by the signing of the Peace Accord brought with it a distorted image of the ELN's military capabilities. Media outlets have painted a picture of the group as a strong organization and now the government presents it as the great enemy. None of this is true. Confrontation with the ELN does not require the same level of violence that debilitating the defunct FARC-EP did, because of three factors:

It is a smaller guerrilla group both numerically and in terms of its territorial presence. While over the past few years the group has experienced growth and has grown stronger, neither has occurred at the same rapid pace as the regional criminal structures, which have, in two years, achieved the military capability to control entire regions.

In this sense, the conflict statistics are revealing. At the time that the Caguán DMZ ended, the FARC-EP had around 17,000 soldiers and ended 2016 with 7,000 and presence in 242 municipalities. In contrast, after its fortification and expansion process, the ELN today has a little more than 3,000 combatants and presence in 136 municipalities in 6 regions: Arauca, Catatumbo, Magdalena Medio, Chocó, Cauca and Nariño. Additionally, it is important to keep in mind that with the exception of Arauca, the ELN is in active confrontation with other armed groups such as the Gulf Clan, post-FARC groups and the EPL, which can sap force and capability when the time comes to resist or respond to a possible State offensive.

(ii) The group's military capabilities are weaker than those that the FARC-EP used to have. This is reflected in the actions it carries

out and its action repertoire: while the FARC-EP carried out approximately 2,300 actions per year, the ELN only manages a maximum of 400. Additionally, a significant part of their actions correspond to acts of sabotages against petroleum or military infrastructure, some harrying and, to a smaller extent, minor combat operations or ambushes, which reveal a limited ability to destabilize the State.

(iii) The group has fewer logistical and financial resources, which makes it difficult to recover from attacks by the military or any other armed actor. An illustration of this is what happened after the paramilitary attacks at the end of the 90's, since it took the group approximately 6 years to recover. Regarding the financial aspects, it is important to keep in mind that while the ELN participates in some drug trafficking and illegal mining activities, it should not be assumed that these represent guaranteed sources of income, for, as was previously mentioned, the group competes with other illegal groups for control over territory and illegal revenue.

Added to this is the fact that the Armed Forces' capabilities are much greater than in previous years, which is particularly reflected in the technology and training that both the Police and Army receive.

Lack of Leadership

As is known, significant controversies about the future of the group, especially relating to peace negotiations, have arisen inside the ELN. These were expressed with greater fervor during the peace process, with some leaders distancing themselves from the initiative or expressing skepticism at the process, while some regions under the group's control acted out against the negotiators' objectives. The most visible case was that of Commander Uriel of the Guerra Occidental Front in Chocó who,

during these circumstances, went from being a total unknown to being one of the group's authorized spokespeople and perhaps the only one that Central Command authorized to give interviews in Colombia.

The issue is that the faction in favor of the Peace Process and negotiated exit to the conflict has been compromised by the absence of Pablo Beltrán and Gabino in Colombia. Both of these Central Command

members have had the exercise of their high command negatively affected by their inability to return to the country since the impasse, due to the government's breach of the protocols that should have gone into effect when talks broke down.

Their absence does not mean that the ELN has been left without leadership. It does mean, however, that those in command in Colombia are exactly the leaders who were skeptical of the Peace Process and who were using a discourse of guerrilla honor and dignity to push for other options that would continue the war. The ELN's current Acting Commander in Chief is Antonio García, who has historically occupied the position of responsible militar and controls the finances at the center of the organization. García, despite being the person who signed the Negotiations Agenda, represents the hawkish wing of the organization, the faction that least supports dialogue and which engages in little political calculation. García is also the person who aims for the guerrilla group to be able to destabilize the State, even though this would mean damaging the group's political prestige even more. A reflection of this is the attack on the Cadetes School, which was justified with the idea that it represented a legitimate target.


Thus, since García took over the reins, the ELN has made a greater effort to demonstrate its military capabilities. It has deepened its connection to drug trafficking in every region where the guerrilla group is present (with the exception of Arauca), with the objective of increasing its income, and has neglected the ethical regulations that once characterized the organization. This is reflected in community accusations of grave violations of human rights and harm to the integrity of people who live in the regions under the group's control, but also in the pacts made with criminal and drug trafficking organizations, including Mexican cartels.

The Eastern and Northeastern War Fronts (Los Frentes de Guerra Oriental y Nororiental)

have secured their power in Arauca and Catatumbo, respectively, and remain the dominant actors in both regions. This has allowed them to consolidate a corridor along the entire Venezuelan border, including municipalities within Cúcuta's metropolitan area. In spite of the confrontations they have had with the Gulf Clan and other criminal structures, the organization has managed to remain intact, indicative of its military capabilities.

Additionally, its strategic alliance with the Post-FARC group headed by Gentil Duarte and other commanders of the defunct Eastern Bloque of the FARC, has allowed the guerrilla group to continue grow stronger, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

This transitional process that the ELN appears to be undergoing is not yet reflected in its military activity; despite the armed strike decreed for the organization's anniversary last July, violence levels remain similar to those of the last three years.



Source: Systemization of Press Notes and Territorial Work. Created by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation

Currently, the ELN is present in 136 municipalities in the country. The Darío Ramírez Castro War Front, present in the Magdalena Medio region, was the worst hit during the Santos administrations, which took down several historic commanders in southern Bolívar. However, in the past year, the structures in this region have recovered, financially speaking, and they have a militia base that has allowed them to regroup.

The structures in Antioquia belonging to this Front are immersed in the spiral of confrontation in northern, northeastern and Bajo Cauca. There, they have a non-aggression pact with the Caparrapos and have decided to openly confront the Gulf Clan to halt the latter's expansion into the San Lucas Mountains.

The Western and Southwestern War Fronts have experienced a significant expansion thanks to the financial structure provided by drug trafficking. During 2018, they maintained a constant confrontation with the Gulf Clan and arrived in areas of Atrato and Urabá where they previously were not present. In southern Antioquia, they managed to expand and consolidate in some municipalities. Finally,

they made a nonaggression pact with the Gulf Clan, which has allowed them to increase finances stemming from drug trafficking and illegal mining as well as expand into Valle del Cauca, where they arrived to control the rural areas of Buenaventura and some neighborhoods in Borough 12 in the city.

The Southwestern War Front, present in Cauca and Nariño, has expanded at a slower rate but has increased significantly in terms of financial capabilities. The areas of its expansion correspond particularly to the municipalities along the Pacific coast where they previously had little control. With the FARC-EP's exit from the region, this Front took over this territory, including its sources of illegal income, making pacts with Colombian drug traffickers and Mexican cartels to do so.

The Urban War Front has committed some violent acts; however, it is not possible to say that these reflect a strengthened organization. Rather, these seem more likely to be a reflection of improved military strategy.

Since the signing of the Final Accord, the ELN has expanded into 35 municipalities:


Department	Municipality
Antioquia	Murindó
Antioquia	Yondó
Cauca	Buenos Aires
Cauca	Caloto
Cauca	Corinto
Cauca	Miranda
Cauca	Suarez
Cauca	Toribío
Cauca	Guapi
Cauca	López
Cauca	Timbiquí
Cesar	La Jagua de Ibirico
Cesar	Aguachica
Cesar	Chiriguaná
Cesar	Curumaní
Chocó	Bahía Solano
Chocó	Carmen del Darién
Chocó	Juradó
Chocó	Riosucio
Nariño	Guachucal
Nariño	Túquerres
Nariño	Policarpa
Nariño	Roberto Payán
Nariño	La Tola
Nariño	Mosquera
Norte de Santander	Cúcuta

Norte de Santander	Puerto Santander
Norte de Santander	Villa del Rosario
Norte de Santander	El Zulia
Norte de Santander	Los Patios
Norte de Santander	Herrán
Valle del Cauca	Buenaventura
Valle del Cauca	Calima
Vichada	Cumaribo
Vichada	Puerto Carreño

With regard to this situation, three general conclusions can be reached.

- Of the 281 municipalities the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation prioritized for the post-conflict, there is a group of 123 where the FARC-EP previously operated which have since been occupied by illegal armed groups and criminal organizations. In other words, there is another group of more than 100 municipalities where the post-conflict won and the period of political violence has ended. In fact, within these 123 municipalities, there are several where the extent of territorial take over by armed groups is actually low. There, the Armed Forces, along with other State institutions, could rapidly regain control and ensure security. With things as they stand now, of the 123 occupied municipalities, 107 of these have significant security problems. See map below.

Expansion and/or Consolidation of Illegal Armed Structures into Municipalities Crossed with Rate of Coca Cultivation, 2019




100 0 100 200 300 400 km

123 Municipios de expansión y/o consolidación de estructuras armadas ilegales

Densidad de Cultivo

0.1 - 1.0 ha/km ²	2.1 - 4.0 ha/km ²	> 8 ha/km ²
1.1 - 2.0 ha/km ²	4.1 - 8.0 ha/km ²	

- The Peace Process had an impressive impact on the reduction in the number of various indicators of violence related to the armed conflict. The returns on peace are high. However, today, nearly three years after the Peace Accord was signed, security measures must be reinforced to avoid a new wave of violence. It is not yet clear if the armed conflict that plagued the country for more than 50 years has been overcome.
- Between 2012 and 2017, there was an incredible reduction in violence indicators. In 2018, some of these indicators increased, particularly homicide. In 2019, they have fallen yet again, returning to 2017 levels. However, this good news brings with it a problematic diagnosis: much of this reduction is owed to the pacts formed among various criminal organizations (such as occurred in the Pacific region of Nariño), or in other cases, to the emergence of a single dominant armed group (as in Catatumbo), or to the decision of criminal actors to lay low while they regroup (as in Putumayo). In any of these three scenarios, violence levels fall. In other words, levels of violence are not proportional to the presence of criminal organizations.
- FARC-EP dissidents, the division among their ranks after demobilization and disarmament, the possibility that Iván Márquez and Jesús Santrich may seriously dedicate themselves to waging a new war, along with the growth of the ELN and the Gulf Clan, and the controversies and grave problems facing the implementation of the Peace Accord, have all deferred the dream of putting an end to the armed conflict and taking steps toward national reconciliation.
- As has already been mentioned, the presence and expansion of illegal economies such as drug trafficking and illegal mining put enormous stress on the transition and post-conflict. President Duque, who announced a large-scale offensive against illegal crops and drug trafficking, only managed to reduce coca by 2,000 hectares, only decreasing the total area of coca cultivation from 210,000 to 208,000 hectares; at the same time, there are serious indications that coca production has actually increased. Illegal mining, for its part, has decreased, but as gold prices are now rising, this practice may increase drastically. It is likely that, owing to current economic fluctuations, the volume of illegal mining will increase (in contrast with the general downward trend of recent years) while coca production decreases. But at its root, the problem will remain the same.

A photograph of a statue, likely a political figure, wearing a green cape and a red mask. The statue is set against a bright, overexposed background. A white circle is overlaid on the lower half of the image, containing the main title text. The text is in a bold, white, sans-serif font.

**Political Violence
during Duque's
Administration: Three
Sides of the Same
Coin**

In this section, the three expressions of political violence present in the national territory are analyzed. First, an account is given of some of the tendencies associated with the phenomenon of the victimization of social leaders. Next, the wave of assassinations of FARC-EP ex-combatants is explored. Finally, electoral violence, understood as violence carried out against people involved in the electoral process in various ways, is analyzed, with special attention given to the recent local elections which occurred on October 27, 2019.

While these three expressions of the phenomenon of political violence tend to be interrelated, and, in practice, social leadership, reincorporation and participation in processes related to representative democracy can be considered different sides of the same coin, our analysis differentiates between different victims' profiles, as this allows for an understanding of the similarities and differences between the evolution and behavior of each context. However, it is important to emphasize that each sub-category, with its distinctive features and tendencies, denotes forms of violence which affect participatory rights which limit democracy-building processes and undermine the territorial peace

building championed by different actors, at different levels. For the sake of methodological transparency, each of the cases included in the database employed for these analyses¹² has been prioritized according to the role he or she had which presumably led to that person's victimization.

As will be seen, according to the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation's information, the number of leaders assassinated continues to increase, reaching 330 victims recorded between the signing of the Peace Accord on November 24, 2016 and December 3, 2019. Additionally, the number of people in the process of reincorporation assassinated is over a hundred (117) and electoral violence has claimed one victim approximately every two days.

In light of this complex situation of political violence, the government does not appear to have identified effective alternatives to confront it. What is more, many of the methods which are applied follow a rearview-mirror policy which [dobla instancias]¹³, ignores previous advances and blurs current goals. Solutions seem distant.

Regional Electoral Violence

Historically, regional elections have been plagued by violence, making it risky for citizens to exercise their political rights. By the end of the October 27, 2019 elections, this pattern had once again been reaffirmed. The number of people victimized for their participation in electoral processes increased drastically as the electoral calendar advanced, claiming the lives of

more than twenty people and affecting more than two hundred. Additionally, the behavior of this phenomenon reflects diverse violent and corrupt actors resorting directly and indirectly to assassination and intimidation as they competed to safeguard their interests through the election of certain candidates.

According to information obtained by the

12 These analyses have been constructed based on the information system Sipares (www.sipares.pares.com.co/sociedadcivil), which provides primary information gathered from social and political organizations and movements, from local and regional media and, finally, from regional researchers.

13 This is the case of the Timely Prevention and Protection Action Plan, PAO (Plan de Acción Oportuna de Prevención y Protección).


Foundation for Peace and Reconciliation, as the electoral battle wore on, electoral violence turned more deadly and individualized, affecting local moguls. That is, gradually, fewer collective threats were recorded while the number of incidents of select, individualized violence increased. For instance, the last three months of the electoral calendar (August, September and October) were the most violent. Serious cases such as the massacre in Suárez, Cauca in which mayoral candidate Karina García, and council candidate Yeison Obando were assassinated, and the assassination of Bernardo Betancourt, mayoral candidate in Tibú occurred during this period.

Additionally, the regions where these acts occurred did not necessarily correspond to areas historically affected by the armed conflict, such as northern Valle del Cauca and the Atlantic coast. In most cases, (72% in all) it was impossible to identify the perpetrator. One fact that stood out was that the most victimized political sectors were those with the greatest potential for electoral growth:

the government coalition and the opposition.

Our understanding of political violence follows Article 40 of the Colombian Constitution, which states that every citizen has the right to participate in the configuration, exercise and control of political power. The electoral violence described in this report is understood as a subcategory of political violence temporally demarcated within the development of elections and committed against individuals or groups in the interest of affecting the free exercise of these rights. Acts of violence were reported against public officials, pre-candidates, candidates, members of political parties and movements. Individuals overseeing the activities of local politicians or political groups who denounced cases of corruption were also victimized.

In a timely manner, the number of victims and acts of victimization committed between the beginning of the electoral calendar (October 27, 2018) and election day (October 27, 2019) were analyzed.




Source: The Peace and Reconciliation Foundation

The Facts

During the 365 days of the electoral calendar, the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation's SIPARES information system recorded 193 acts of electoral violence that left a total of 246 victims. While collective threats dominated the period between October 2018 and February

2019¹⁴, as the year wore on, a tendency toward more individualized forms of violence formed, though the troubling average of one person victimized every 1.48 days remained consistent.

Electoral Violence from October 27, 2018 to October 27, 2019



14 In the graph "Number of Victims vs Number of Violent Acts (10/27/2018 - 10/27/2019)", this is evident in the distance between the line depicting acts of violence and that depicting victims.

Acts of electoral violence were reported in 28 departments and Bogotá and 65.44% of all victims were concentrated in 10 of these departments. The following table summarizes this distribution.


Victims in the 10 Departments Most Affected by Electoral Violence (10/27/2018 - 10/27/2019)

Department	Victims
Valle del Cauca	25
La Guajira	24
Cauca	18
Antioquia	18
Tolima	18
Bogotá	13
Santander	11
Cesar	11
Córdoba	11
Nariño	10


Source: The Peace and Reconciliation Foundation

Threats represented the most common act of violence, with 179 victims of 129 acts. There were 33 attacks registered, 25 targeted assassinations¹⁵ and 6 cases of

kidnapping in the form of illegal detention¹⁶ August and September registered the greatest number of fatal victims.




Source: The Peace and Reconciliation Foundation



Source: The Peace and Reconciliation Foundation

15 Threats were concentrated mostly in the departments of Guajira (21), Tolima (18) and Valle del Cauca (17); homicides in Valle del Cauca (5) and Cauca (4); and attacks in Norte de Santander (5), Santander (4) and Cauca (4).

16 Regarding this last kind of violence, it is worth mentioning that in September, a case of "self-kidnapping" occurred in Potosí, Nariño. This data point was eliminated from our data bases, yet it is still worth mentioning as it shows the lows to which certain political strategies can reach in contexts of generalized violence.



Source: The Peace and Reconciliation Foundation

The Victims

Since the start of the electoral calendar (October 27, 2018), 118 candidates and pre-candidates were victims of electoral violence. This made citizens aspiring to hold public office the most victimized population and shows how victimizers sought to limit access to political representation. To the extent that violence was used as a way of gaining an edge over rivals, the motives for electoral violence varied from the elimination

of opponents with conflicting agendas and competition between candidates with links to criminal enterprises, to safeguarding or promoting territorial control by illegal actors whose interests were threatened.

Violence against candidates and pre-candidates was distributed the following way:

Aspiración del candidato/a víctima de violencia electoral	Número de víctimas
Alcaldía	76
Concejo	26
Gobernación	10
Asamblea	6

Source: The Peace and Reconciliation Foundation


Aspiración del precandidato/a víctima de violencia electoral	Número de víctimas
Alcaldía	13
Concejo	5
Gobernación	1
	6

Source: The Peace and Reconciliation Foundation

As the above tables illustrates, candidates to offices filled through direct election were the principal targets of attacks. Sixty-nine public officials-elect were victimized; of these, most were councilmembers (40), followed by mayors (10), senators (7) and 20 public servants who filled various governmental roles¹⁷. Similarly, acts of electoral violence were reported against 4 corruption whistle-blowers and 16 party insiders in various positions.

¹⁷ Among these are acts of violence against district or municipal representatives (13) whose work requires control of and direct involvement in electoral processes.


**Electoral Violence according to Office or Political Activity
from October 27, 2018 to October 27, 2019**



- | | |
|--|----------------------------------|
| ▲ Funcionario Público 20 | ▲ Miembros de partido 20 |
| ▲ Funcionario público de elección popular 69 | ▲ Precandidato y/o candidato 137 |

The most victimized political sectors were those with the greatest potential for electoral growth: opposition and government coalition parties. Analyzed in light of political affiliation, this indicator showed the following distribution:

1. Opposition parties registered 71 victims representing 29% of all violent acts reported. Of these, 56 corresponded to threats, 8 to attacks, 3 to assassinations, 2 to illegal detentions, 1 to a case of persecution and 1 to a case of private information theft.
2. Government coalition parties also registered 71 cases (29%). Fifty threats, 10 attacks, 8 assassinations, 2 cases of kidnapping and 1 case of extortion were reported.
3. Independent parties registered 48 victims (19%) and suffered 30 threats, 9 attacks, 8 assassinations and 1 case of illegal detention. Proportionally, this sector experienced the highest rate of fatal violence; 16.6% of all violent acts against them were fatal.
4. Lastly, in 23% of cases, the political affiliation of the victims was unknown, due to the inability to use their profiles¹⁸ to determine their political affiliation. Most of these were public officials (20), followed by candidates (16) and pre-candidates (9).



Source: The Peace and Reconciliation Foundation

¹⁸ In accordance with this report's definition of electoral violence, profiles without political affiliation were also registered. This is the case, for instance, of district and municipal representatives, public officials that were not elected by popular vote and corruption whistleblowers. What is more, electoral violence was analyzed since the beginning of the electoral calendar (10/27/2018); during this early period pre-candidates and other hopefuls were registered without defining their political party. Finally, in some cases, the nature of the organization associated with the profile makes it difficult to determine the person's political affiliation, as in the case of some significant citizens' movements.


Regionally, acts of violence against each of these political sectors can be broken down as follows:

- The greatest number of victims of government coalition parties was registered in Tolima, Norte de Santander, Valle del Cauca, Bolívar and La Guajira.
- Acts against opposition parties were concentrated in Bogotá, Nariño, Tolima and Valle del Cauca.
- Electoral violence against independent parties was concentrated above all in Cauca, La Guajira, Valle del Cauca and Córdoba.

Departments with the Greatest Number of Victims by Party Affiliation


Political Party Affiliation	Total Number of Victims	Department with the Greatest Number of Victims	# Victims
Government-Backed	71	Tolima	7
		Norte de Santander	6
		Bolívar	6
		Valle del Cauca	6
		Antioquia	5
		Bogotá	11
		Valle del Cauca	8
Opposition	71	Nariño	6
		Tolima	6
		Guajira	6
		Guajira	8
		Cauca	7
Independent	48	Valle del Cauca	6
		Córdoba	4
		Antioquia	4

Source: The Peace and Reconciliation Foundation



Source: The Peace and Reconciliation Foundation

Electoral Violence By Party, Organization or Political Movement Affiliation from October 27, 2018 to October 27, 2019



100 0 100 200 300 400 km




- ★ Gobierno 27
- ★ Movimiento o partido afín oposición 43
- ★ Independiente 25
- ★ No especificó 48

143 víctimas en total


The Perpetrators

Although acts of electoral violence were attributed to various actors, in 72% of registered cases it was not possible to identify an alleged perpetrator. That is, of 246 registered victims, the material or intellectual authors of the crime could not be identified in 177 cases. Likewise, of

the 129 threats registered during the electoral period (which produced 179 victims), in 65.92% of the cases the victimizer is unknown; in 88% of all assassinations during this period the perpetrator remains unidentified.



Source: The Peace and Reconciliation Foundation



Source: The Peace and Reconciliation Foundation

The Águilas Negras—an illegal structure that has not existed since at least 2011—was the identified perpetrator of the greatest number of registered acts of victimization, allegedly responsible for 13.4% of all acts of electoral violence. Despite the fact that it was impossible to identify acts of fatal violence perpetrated by this group, the profiles most frequently victimized by this group were mayoral candidates (8) followed by council candidates (6), party members (6), members of congress (4) and representatives (2). These acts occurred in Atlántico (Barranquilla), Bogotá, Boyacá (Duitama), Caldas (Manizales), Cesar (El Copey), Córdoba (Lorica), Guajira (Manaure), Huila (Pitalito), Nariño (Tumaco), Putumayo (Mocoa), Risaralda (Pueblo Rico), Tolima (Ibagué, Rovira, Coello and Planadas) and Valle del Cauca (Cali, Jamundí, Calima and Buga), among others.

Strikingly, pamphlets and threats attributed to the Gulf Clan began to be reported in the second semester of the electoral calendar. The first threat was registered in May against a council pre-candidate in Malambo, Atlántico. Six of 16 total victims (37.7%) of acts attributed to the Clan were registered between July and August. In light of this, it is important to draw attention to the threats made against the current mayor and three mayoral hopefuls in Ovejas, Sucre in the Montes de María region, which join complaints made by rural residents of nearby El Salado about the presence of the armed group.

On election day, 7 acts of electoral violence were attributed to the Gulf Clan but, as in the case of the Águilas Negras, no fatal acts or aggressions beyond threats have been pinned to them.

As for the ELN, 5 registered acts left a total of 7 victims; most of these occurred in the department of Cesar (Becerril, Pueblo Bello and Pelaya) where they are known to have a robust presence. Unlike other armed groups,

the ELN does not restrict its acts of electoral violence to threats; acts of kidnapping, such as that of mayoral candidate Tulio Mosquera in Alto Baudó, Chocó, and of illegal detention, as in the case of Edwar Pérez Acosta, mayor of Pelaya (Cesar), were also attributed to the group.

Lastly, Post-FARC Armed Groups (GAPF for its initials in Spanish) represented the third most prolific perpetrator of acts of electoral violence, accounting for 12 victims. While threats against candidates in Cauca, Córdoba, Cundinamarca and Norte de Santander constituted the majority of acts attributed to these groups, they are also considered responsible for the massacre in Suárez, Cauca, in which Karina García and Yeison Obando, both candidates, were assassinated. According to the information obtained by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation, these groups substantially increased the number of violent acts committed toward the end of the electoral calendar: 11 acts occurred between September and October of 2019.

One case that occurred during the last three months of the electoral calendar stands out. Amid confusing circumstances, the Army shot and wounded the Departmental Secretary of the ASI Party, Yolanda González García and killed her bodyguard—assigned to her by the National Office of Protection (Unidad Nacional de Protección)—on September 19th in the department of Arauca. The Armed Forces are therefore considered alleged authors of electoral violence in two cases. The first of these occurred in April, when Joaquín Gómez, FARC Party pre-candidate to the governorship in La Guajira, denounced persecution by military intelligence groups.

The following table details the geographic distribution of alleged perpetrators:

Perpetrators of Electoral Violence

Alleged Perpetrator	Number of Victims	Departments	Number of Victims by Department
Desconocido	177	Valle del Cauca Guajira Antioquia Tolima Cauca Santander Bolívar Norte de Santander Nariño Magdalena Arauca Bogotá Cesar Meta Sucre Atlántico Boyacá Caquetá Chocó Córdoba Cundinamarca Quindío Risaralda Guaviare Huila Putumayo Caldas San Andrés	20 19 17 14 14 11 10 8 7 7 6 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Águilas Negras	33	Bogotá Tolima Valle del Cauca Guajira Huila Nariño Córdoba Putumayo Boyacá Cesar Risaralda Caldas Atlántico	6 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1

Grupos Armado Postfarc	12	Cauca Norte de Santander Córdoba Cundinamarca	4 4 3 1
Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC)	7	Sucre Atlántico Cauca Antioquia	4 1 1 1
Ejército Nacional de Liberación (ELN)	7	Sucre Cauca Antioquia Atlántico	4 1 1 1
Caparrapos	4	Córdoba	4
Muerte Enemigos de la Patria	2	Bogotá	2
Fuerzas Militares	2	Guajira Arauca	1 1
Los Guajiros	1	Valle del Cauca	1
Autodefensas Unidas de la Sierra Nevada	1	Bolívar	1

Source: The Peace and Reconciliation Foundation


Selective Assassination of Social Leaders

This section explores in detail the selective assassinations committed against social leaders since the signing of the Final Peace Accord on November 24, 2016 through December 3, 2019. During this period, the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation documented 330 assassinations of social leaders in Colombia.

Though the number of assassinations of social leaders decreased slightly during the first semester of 2018 compared to 2019, the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation concurs with other civil society organizations and human rights platforms that threats against these leaders have increased. These are aggressions

that have the same intention to halt and undermine social and community processes for the revindication of rights and guarantees and which compromise the economic and political interests of legal and illegal agents.

Homicides of Social Leaders and Human Rights Defenders by Municipality between November 24, 2016 and December 3, 2019




Asesinatos selectivos contra líderes sociales

Dark Red	10 a 12	Red	7 a 9	Light Orange	1 a 3
Orange	4 a 6				

292 asesinatos selectivos contra líderes sociales en 155 municipios

One of the most relevant findings is that incidents of selective assassination are not evenly distributed throughout the country. On the contrary, they are concentrated in five zones where war economies persist


and multiple illegal armed structures are present, as in the Bajo Cauca region in Antioquia, Urabá, Norte del Cauca, Tumaco and Catatumbo regions.



Source: Sipares

The leadership positions most affected by homicidal violence have been those of Community Action Committees (Juntas de Acción Comunal) and indigenous, rural and afro-descendant communities. Their victims worked for land reclamation, opposed the development of illegal economies such as drug trafficking and illegal mining, defended

the implementation of the Peace Accord—those who supported the Comprehensive National Crop Substitution Program, PNIS were especially targeted—and fought for the collective and territorial rights of Black and indigenous communities.



Source: Sipares

This aligns with the systematic hypothesis proposed by the Office of the Attorney General which cites the fact that approximately 50% of victims were members of the Community Action Committee, a principal form of organization at the local level which promotes community processes through participation in neighborhoods and veredas throughout the country.

Regarding the LGBTQ+ community, acts of victimization against LGBTQ+ leaders carry with them a particular connotation in the exercise of violence against victims' gender non-conforming bodies and identities. Violence against these victims is marked by cruelty—sexual violence and torture are common—and victimizers apply signifiers of hate and stigmatization to their crimes. The


assassination of LGBTQ+ leader Danna Méndez in Chaparral in southern Tolima in November 2018 exemplifies this phenomenon.

It is worth emphasizing that most of the territories where selective violence is concentrated are “ethnic territories” (territorios étnicos), meaning that their populations have been marginalized and historically condemned to violence and obscurity. Today these communities are once again targets of abuse, due to a lack of state protection and safeguards to shield them as they defend their human rights.

Additionally, the intensity of violent phenomena varies according to the relationships between illegal armed structures—such as the Gulf Clan, Post-FARC Armed Groups, ELN, among

others—and residents, and between these groups and local elites who use their criminal services to consolidate economic activities, as has occurred in the Urabá subregion, where the so-called “Anti-Restitution Army” has emerged to defend the interests of large landowners. Of the 330 assassinations registered by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation, the perpetrator is unknown in 86% of the cases. The Gulf Clan, ELN, Post-FARC Armed Groups (GAPF) and the Armed Forces are the armed structures identified most often in cases of selective assassination. For its part, the Office of the Attorney General has pointed to the

“clarification”¹⁹ of 57% of the cases registered between 2016 and May of 2019. However, the arrest and trial of those responsible is only just beginning, yet already evinces impunity in cases of victimization of social leaders. This is evident above all in efforts to determine the intellectual authors of these crimes; according to information provided by the Office of the Attorney General itself, this identification has only advanced in 21.85% of cases where “advances in clarification” were reported by April 2019²⁰.



Source: Sipares

19 Various organizations, among them the Programa Somos Defensores, called attention to the “rhetorical and media-based” ploy driving the use of this term by the Office of the Attorney General, which employed it to demonstrate progress in investigations and imputations but not necessarily in prosecutions, sentences or sanctions, thus obscuring the true results.
20 See the letter written by then-Attorney General Néstor Humberto Martínez from April 3, 2019, addressed to the International Penal Court’s Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda.

To this context is added the national government’s position, which might be called a policy of stigmatization of communities and social leaders. This position is evident in the Bases for the National Development Plan (Bases del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo) which identifies communities and grassroots organizations “infiltrated by organized armed groups” as a security threat. Additionally, the constant declarations of then-Defense

Minister Guillermo Botero stigmatizing social protest and the false or misleading information (which the government classifies as “errors”) sent from institutional social networks—such as the tweet posted on May 18, 2019 from the Defense Ministry’s official account (see below)—have created a hostile environment that legitimizes violence against community structures.



First Tweet

Second Tweet

Excuses offered

However, the constant stigmatization of individuals occupying various leadership positions (and their organizations) is not unique to this administration or pro-government sectors in general; different sectors have long accused certain leaders being instigators of criminality and institutional discord.

The steps taken by the government to protect leaders, specifically through the Timely Prevention and Protection Action Plan (PAO), which proposes coordinated institutional action to mitigate this phenomenon, has not

achieved the expected results. Its principal criticisms have been:

1. It prioritizes the presence of senior government officials and excludes civil society, fomenting mistrust of institutional action in social movements.
2. It creates a new institution instead of strengthening the one already created by the Peace Accord: the Commission on Security Guarantees (point 3.4.3).

3. It replicates a repressive and reactive security approach, undervaluing approaches based on guaranteeing rights, community participation or recognition of collective knowledge.
4. General Leonardo Alfonso Barrero Gordillo's appointment as the PAO's director is problematic, given that he has

been accused of obstructing investigations into "false positives"²¹. Following multiple denouncements and the upheaval caused by his appointment, Interior Minister Nancy Patricia Gutiérrez moved him to another role: military liaison to the National Police in the matter of the victimization of leaders.

The Peace and Reconciliation Foundation's Three Hypotheses

The Peace and Reconciliation Foundation has proposed three hypotheses that could shed light on the motives behind aggressions against FARC-EP ex-combatants and their families.

1. **Peace Saboteurs:** Legal or illegal agents opposed to the political project championed by the Common Alternative Revolutionary Force, FARC Party and to the implementation of the Final Peace Accord.
2. **Settling of Scores:** This hypothesis is divided into two scenarios. The first posits that when the defunct FARC-EP withdrew to veredas, many sources of tension with other illegal armed structures remained unresolved. This is the case of the Gulf Clan in Bajo Atrato and of the ELN in Arauca and Nariño. The second contributes these acts of violence to territorial vendettas born of the abuses and aggressions carried out in the past by members of the then-guerrilla army.
3. **Territorial Reconfiguration:** Given ex-combatants' life trajectories and knowledge of war strategies, terrain and illegal businesses, many armed structures have sought to recruit

ex-guerrillas to strengthen their criminal activities. However, when their invitation is declined (as it often is), these armed groups retaliate by taking the lives of ex-combatants and even their families.

Violence against FARC-EP ex-guerrillas has a substantial impact on the possibilities of building peace and achieving reconciliation. The high rate of victimization coupled with the government's inability to guarantee their safety, is one of the greatest incentives for recidivism and for seeking protection from criminal structures.

Academics and research centers specializing in demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) processes appear to agree that physical security is the cornerstone that determines the success or failure of reintegration into civil society and that it is also a factor in recidivism.

In turn, the lack of political will to launch and maintain the National Commission on Security Guarantees and the Special Investigation Unit—entities created by the Peace Accord (points 3.4.3 and 3.4.4) as stopgap measures

²¹ In an official Ministry of the Interior comunique dated January 16th which expands upon the information provided at the official presentation of the PAO in San Vicente del Caguán, Minister Gutiérrez presented General Barrero as the Plan's director.

to counter violence and criminality—further complicates the creation of possible solutions to mitigate the risks facing those who endorsed the Accord. It also reflects a lack of state commitment to the well-being of ex-guerrillas.

Additionally, critical (not to mention shameful) episodes such as the participation of the Army's Vulcan Task Force in the torture, attempted forced disappearance and assassination of ex-guerrilla Dimar Torres, who had joined community life in the Campo Alegre vereda located in Convención, Norte de Santander on April 22nd, represent aggravating

circumstances of the first order, given that the Army is tasked with protecting the defense of life and the security of rural communities in areas where armed groups are present.

Regarding this episode, the former Defense Minister, Guillermo Botero, who allegedly encouraged a cover-up of the soldiers involved, made offensive declarations (without evidence) that disobeyed due process for possible human rights violations by the Armed Forces. Such actions generate insecurity and deepen the gaps of the already battered implementation of the reintegration process.

Locations of Violence against Ex-Guerrillas


As can be observed in the following map and graph, the departments which registered the greatest number of assassinations of ex-guerrilla members are: Cauca (28), Nariño (22), Antioquia (17), Norte de Santander (14) and Caquetá (10); within these, the municipalities most affected are: Ituango (Antioquia), El Charco (Nariño), Tumaco (Nariño), El Tarra (Norte de Santander) and Argelia (Cauca). Additionally, 26 family members of ex-

combatants have been assassinated in 12 departments²².

In most of these regions, the FARC-EP once had a strong presence; when the group disarmed, these areas saw the reconfiguration of the remaining illegal actors as they jockeyed for territorial control and control over illegal revenues derived from drug trafficking and illegal mining.


²²The departments with the greatest number of these crimes are Antioquia (6), Cauca (3), Nariño (3) and Chocó (3).

Number of Assassinations of FARC-EP Ex-Combatants by Department (10 Most Victimized) (11/24/2016-12/09/2019)



Source: Sipares

Homicides of Social Leaders and Human Rights Defenders by Municipality between November 24, 2016 and December 3, 2019



Moreover, the electoral landscape heightened the risks faced by members of the FARC Party. During this period, 29 ex-guerrillas were killed, principally in the departments of Cauca (8), Nariño (4) and Meta (4).

One of the most emblematic cases occurred in Tuluá, where hired assassins on motorcycle killed Jorge Enrique Corredor, better known as Wilson Saavedra, ex-commander of the 21st Front, who has in charge of that front's reintegration process in the reintegration camp (Espacio Territorial de Capacitación y Reincorporación, ETCR for its initials in Spanish) located in the municipality of Planadas. According to information provided

by the National Office of Protection (UNP), in August 2018 Corredor renounced the security detail that had been assigned to him due to his activism. Corredor was the first high ranking member of the FARC Party assassinated since the Peace Accord was signed.

It is the government's responsibility to take urgent action to stop this tragedy, comply with what was agreed upon and guarantee Colombian society's right to peace. Likewise, it is necessary to engage in advocacy to combat the stigmatization against this population fomented, in large part, by the Democratic Center, the administration's political party.

The PNIS's Breaking Point: Taking Stock of the Program One Year later

The Comprehensive National Crop Substitution Program (PNIS) is one of the programs that figures into the Accord between the Colombian government and the defunct FARC-EP to incentivize the eradication of illicit crops. Its goal is to help rural families involved in or proximal to the illegal narcotics production chain so that they may replace this economy with dignified work through the development of formalized agricultural projects.

Since Iván Duque, who disagrees with several aspects of the Peace Accord, took office, doubts have surged both in Colombia and abroad about the future fulfillment of the deal. In his first speech as president, Duque announced that the executive branch would spearhead a restructuring of the Accord. At the same time, the Constitutional Court insisted that all parties, including the State, are obliged to comply with it as it stands. Internationally, there is great pressure to support it.

This chapter analyzes the progress of the PNIS

one year since the Democratic Center assumed power. Our conclusions are the following:

1. The first component of the Program—immediate food aid—has begun to benefit 73% of enrolled families. Thirty-nine percent have already received all their benefits. Guaviare, Cauca and Norte de Santander are the departments with the lowest levels of government compliance, even though these departments are where 28% of coca crops in the country are concentrated.
2. The second component, which provides Comprehensive Technical Assistance to families, currently benefits 61% of enrolled families, indicating a very low level of progress and a need to prioritize its growth. The departments most left behind are Córdoba, Cauca and Norte de Santander; the latter are two of the departments with the greatest number of hectares under coca cultivation in the country.

3. The third component, which provides families with supplies for food security and agricultural projects, has been implemented in only 34% of enrolled families. During the first semester, the government did not increase the percentage of families benefiting from the third component; only in July 2019 did this component show an increase of 20%.
4. It is worrisome that the government prioritizes forced eradication over its voluntary counterpart, given that the latter has a much lower rate of replanting than the former. In spite of this, at the close of 2018, 13,351 families were suspended from the program and no other family was permitted to enroll due to a lack of government resources. Financing the Peace Accord's programs is not a priority in Duque's state budget, even though the data from these programs—such as low rates of illicit crop replanting—provide irrefutable evidence of their viability.
5. At least 60 people enrolled in the PNIS have been assassinated in the past two years. In July 2019, the government launched a pilot plan in Tumaco to develop protective measures for populations enrolled in the program. The government hopes to replicate it throughout the country in spite of the complexities unique to each region and the criticisms of social leaders and organizations over the way in which this protection has been provided. In Córdoba, individuals enrolled in the PNIS face extreme risk. Violence in the south of the department requires immediate government attention; both the Gulf Clan and the Caparrapos are extorting from families enrolled in the PNIS a percentage of their immediate food aid subsidies and program supplies. This situation has led to selective violence and substantial brutality.

The PNIS's Advancements


According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which monitors the PNIS, replanting of illegal crops in areas of voluntary eradication is 0.6%.



This rate contrasts sharply with that of forced eradication: the rate of replanting in those areas is 35%: fifty-eight times greater. The results of the PNIS cannot be refuted: assistance to

rural families reduces illegal crops in different regions of the country with a 99% probability of success. The government has a responsibility to comply with this program.


The following map illustrates the municipalities where coca cultivation decreased (green) and those where it increased (red).

Changes in Coca Cultivation in PNIS Municipalities 2017-2018



-  Disminución de cultivos de coca 13.245 hectáreas en 36 municipios
-  Aumento de cultivos de coca 8.072 hectáreas en 17 municipios

The following flowchart outlines government obligations to enrolled families according to the PNIS framework²³:




The first component analyzed is that which makes six payments to families for eradication and food aid.

Food Aid

The following graph shows the percentage of families that have received at least one monthly financial assistance payment of the six promised by the government (in blue) along with the voluntary eradication compliance rate (in orange). The grey line indicates the

number of families enrolled in the program by department. To the left are those departments with the greatest rate of government payment fulfillment; to the right, those with the lowest reported percentages of payment compliance.




²³ For coca harvesters enrolled in the program, a different Attention Plan was developed which provides food aid and options for temporary employment. These individuals work on community projects and other jobs that arise from the Comprehensive Rural Reform policy.

The rate of voluntary eradication compliance for families enrolled in the PNIS is above 80% in all departments. With the exceptions of Meta and Norte de Santander, the other departments evince compliance rates above 90%. At the same time, government fulfillment of payments varies between 49 and 94% (blue bars).

According to the government, up to a cut-off date of November 19, 2019, 72,488 families had received at least one payment. This represents 73% of families individually enrolled.

The highest percentages of families who have received at least one payment are found in the departments of Bolívar, Nariño and Vichada. In the case of Nariño, the government advanced significantly in the second semester, increasing the number of initial payouts, but the low number of families close to completing this component of the program suggests the process is delayed. For their parts, Bolívar and Vichada have low numbers of enrolled families, which aids their position as among the departments with the highest rates of eradication compliance.



Developed by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation

In Meta, Guaviare and Putumayo, where 23% of all coca cultivation is found, the percentage of families who have received at least one payment is high, considering the number of families enrolled in each department is 9,702, 7,251 and 20,331, respectively. However, with departmental prioritization in the second semester of 2019, they now count among the five departments with the lowest levels of payment fulfillment. Despite this, the United

Nations highlighted the great number of hectares now free of coca in these departments (13,009 hectares in all) thanks to the PNIS²⁴.

In the case of Caquetá, the department with the second greatest number of hectares voluntarily eradicated, government fulfillment of immediate food aid is 71%. This means that 4,182 families have not received a single government payment to guarantee their food

security while transitioning from coca cultivation to legal enterprises.

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UNODC, 35,317 hectares of illegal crops have been voluntarily eradicated in all of the program's territories. For this reason, it is hoped that the government makes a greater effort to comply with payments and supplies promised to enrolled families.

Nariño, the department with the second greatest number of enrolled families (17,235) and the one with the greatest number of hectares of coca, has a 97% voluntary eradication compliance rate and 88% of families have received at least one payment. However, a great part of these payments were made in the second semester of 2019. PNIS implementation delays have generated uncertainty in this department.

Additionally, a large number of families in this department were suspended from the program. In Tumaco alone 3,735 suspensions were registered of the 13,351 total that UNODC reported at the end of 2018²⁵.

In Antioquia, where there is a nearly 100% voluntary eradication compliance rate, 26% of families have not yet received a single payment and 3,062 families are without food aid.

Bolívar and Córdoba were departments prioritized in 2019 to increase the percentage of families who had received at least one payment. As of November, 94% of families in Bolívar receive food aid. In Córdoba, as we will see below, the situation is more complicated. While 83% of families receive payments, most are being extorted by armed groups who


demand percentages of their benefits and threaten social leaders, especially Community Action Board presidents.

Cauca and Norte de Santander are departments with low enrollment numbers where voluntary eradication compliance is high, yet they rank among the lowest percentages of families who have received at least one payment. The situation is striking, considering that 30% of all illegal crops in the country are concentrated in these departments.

According to the data, the departments with the greatest number of coca crops are paradoxically those with the lowest rates of State compliance with the program's first component. What is more, it is evident that where there exist greater concentrations of enrolled families, the State has greater difficulties fulfilling its obligations. Disincentivizing coca production is essential to reducing violence in the regions, especially considering that since 2013, the number of hectares under coca cultivation has increased exponentially while at the same time becoming concentrated in fewer and fewer municipalities.

24 See El Tiempo, September 2018. "Naciones Unidas destaca erradicación de coca en Meta y Guaviare." Retrieved from <https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/destacan-erradicacion-de-coca-en-meta-y-guaviare-271564>

25 According to the Ideas for Peace Foundation (Fundación Ideas para la Paz) (2019), these suspensions are due to four causes indicated by the High Council for Stabilization (Alta Consejería para la Estabilización): 1) Registry problems; 2) Irregularities in the documentation presented by families; 3) Breach by families; 4) Breach of the verification condition of the SISBEN.



Developed by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation


Keep in mind that the payments for substitution activities shown in Graph 2 are only the first step of the Immediate Attention Plans (PAI for its initials in Spanish). More than payments, communities demand assistance

to develop agricultural projects, as these now represent the only way families can reduce their economic uncertainty and plan for the future.

Comprehensive Technical Assistance

The PNIS's second component provides technical assistance to develop and support families' agricultural projects. This phase lasts 24 months and is set up to be transversal


with the other components of the program, beginning with the second food aid payment. The following graph shows this component's progress.



Developed by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation.

During the first year of Duque’s term, this component added 6,446 families; very few when considering that only 36% of families were receiving technological assistance to substitute coca crops for stable economic activities. Even though the government insisted that memoranda of understanding were signed in July to assist 25,018 additional families, it is essential to begin technical assistance with these families to avoid economic uncertainty and consolidate state presence in the territories. According to the government, by November 2018, 60,842 families had begun to receive comprehensive technical assistance.

The following graph shows the percentage of families benefiting from Comprehensive Technical Assistance by department (blue bar). This is contrasted with the number of families enrolled (orange line). To the left are the departments with the greatest compliance rate.



Developed by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation²⁴.

The percentage of families receiving Comprehensive Technical Assistance varies between 18 and 80%, with the most successful departments being Valle del Cauca, Guaviare, Arauca and Putumayo, whose implementation rates are above 72%. With the exception of Putumayo, these departments do not have large numbers of enrolled families and represent only 8% of coca crops in the country.

The most troubling departments—those with the greatest number of hectares of illegal crops, namely Nariño, Cauca and Norte de Santander—have received little state attention even though their rural populations complied with eradication. This has left thousands of families without financial assistance; many have resorted to social protests to demand compliance with the PNIS.

Agricultural and Food Security Projects

Regarding this component, the government is required to support: 1) the implementation of projects aimed at developing self-sufficiency and food security, to which end \$1,800,000 is given to each family to raise subsistence crops; and 2) the development of short-cycle projects with rapid returns, such as agricultural products.

With respect to self-sufficiency projects, the government's data are unclear.

- On July 4, Duque's Presidential Advisor on Stabilization and Consolidation Emilio Archila wrote to Luis Almagro, Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS), informing him

²⁴ According to the government, between April 31 and June 30, Comprehensive Technical Assistance services grew by 2,650 families in the departments of Antioquia and Caquetá. This amount is not evident in the graph, as there is no disaggregated information available for these families.

that 13,792 families had benefited under this component, with an investment of 24 billion pesos. This number, divided among the number of families, suggests that \$1,800,000 was given to each, as stipulated by the program.

- However, the UNODC reported that as of April 2019, 14,144 families have memos of understanding for the implementation of food security projects.
- This means that, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, between August 7 and April 31 the government initiated the component with 7,481 families, which would put its

compliance rate at 14% of all enrolled families.


- The government selected 33 additional organizations capable of assisting 44,840 families. The initiation of such a large number of agricultural projects would represent a significant step toward full compliance with the PNIS. However, zero progress was reflected in the data for this component collected between January and July.
- In November, the Presidency of the Republic stated that 34,492 families had received food aid and self-sufficiency subsidies.

Harvesters and Collective Agreements

Coca harvesters signed a different Attention Plan within the program's framework, one which includes food aid and offers different possibilities for temporary employment, including developing specific community projects and other jobs that arise from the implementation of Comprehensive Rural Reform. 16,863 harvesters are enrolled in the PNIS.

According to the UNODC, by April 30, 2,335 harvesters had joined the Attention Plan and were employed in the maintenance of 1,762 kilometers of tertiary roads and 232 schools as well as the reforestation of 39 hectares, among other jobs. This suggests that only 13% of individuals enrolled have received

formal employment from the government. The following graph shows the number of harvesters enrolled by department (blue bar) and the percentage of harvesters benefiting from the Attention Plan (grey line).



Developed by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation²⁵.

Government compliance in this population has been very low, considering how the highest compliance rates are concentrated in departments with fewer than 500 enrolled individuals.

Regarding the 107 collective agreements signed between communities and the PNIS, the Presidential Council for Stabilization and

Consolidation (Consejería Presidencial para la Estabilización y la Consolidación) has insisted that these were not done diligently under the previous administration. Between August 2018 and July 2019, there was no progress toward implementation for the 33,000 families who were immediately enrolled through these agreements. Budget problems have not yet been resolved.


The Prioritization of Glyphosate over Pacts

In February, President Iván Duque promised to eradicate 100,000 hectares of coca in 2019. Eighty percent would be achieved through forced eradication; the remaining 20% through pacts (El Tiempo, June 14, 2019). Glyphosate is essential to achieve this goal; for this reason, the government has asked the Constitutional Court to relax restrictions governing the use of glyphosate in aerial spraying.

In 2017, the Court established certain conditions—considered impossible to fulfill—that must be met in order for the government to resume aerial spraying of glyphosate. One condition, for example, stipulates that

conclusive evidence that glyphosate does not pose a risk to human health or the environment be presented before spraying can be resumed. This forced former President Santos to halt all aerial spraying. Following the issuance of Judgement 387 of the Constitutional Court, there are now strong indications that meeting these conditions will be possible. With this judgement, taken in July 2019, the Court established the steps the government must take to resume the use of glyphosate, demanding that legal and regulatory measures be created that meet the following characteristics:

²⁵ The graph does not include 158 individuals involved in the Harvesters' Attention Plan in Vichada, Meta, Guaviare and Guainía as disaggregated data is not available for these departments.



Conditions to Resume Aerial Spraying of Illegal Crops with Glyphosate. Data from the UNODC through April 31, 2019 .
Developed by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation.2019²⁶ . Elaboración: Fundación Paz & Reconciliación.

In light of this, the government is likely taking steps to meet these conditions so that the National Narcotics Council may resume its Illegal Crops Eradication Program through the Aerial Spraying of Glyphosate (PECIG for its initials in Spanish). It bears remembering that six of nine seats on the Council are filled by government ministers and the other three by the Offices of the Inspector General, Attorney General and Police.

However, according to the Constitutional Court, “the decision must be taken within the framework of public policy derived from Article 4 of the Final Accord [...] in terms of Legislative Act 2 of 2017, Executive Order 896 of 2017 and other instruments of implementation and development” (Judgement 387 of 2019).

26 According to the government, between April 31 and June 30, Comprehensive Technical Assistance was expanded to include 2,650 families in the departments of Antioquia and Caquetá. This number is not included in the graph as no disaggregated information about these families was available.

Violence against Program Participants

On June 27, the United Nations warned that 58 participants of the Crop Substitution Program had been assassinated over the past two years. These acts show selectivity by illegal armed structures targeting families who refuse to continue participating in the drug supply chain.

In the department of Córdoba, the situation is especially troubling. In July, in San José de Uré, alleged Caparrapos members brutally murdered 67-year-old Manuel Osuna Tapias and burned down his house. Ten days later, in Montelíbano, the body of Manuel González Segura was found with his arms tied and showing signs of torture. Both were engaged in crop substitution.

Around the same time, in San José de Uré, gunmen murdered three others enrolled in the program: Jaider Pertuz, Jader Polo and Luis Fernando Velázquez.

This seems to indicate that the armed structures in the subregion—the Gulf Clan and the Caparrapos—are using violence to terrorize individuals enrolled in the PNIS, which explains the degree of brutality in their actions. Regional sources claim that in southern Córdoba these groups allow families to participate in the Program under the condition that they give them a percentage of their Immediate Food Aid and other PNIS benefits.

These homicides, designed to serve as an example to the rest of the population, may be related to pressure from armed structures to engage in extortion. This situation jeopardizes fundamental rights and thus ought to be a government priority.

The last homicide occurred on November 25 in Ituango, Antioquia. Three armed men assassinated Bernardo de Jesús Chancí, a

community leader supported by the PNIS. According to Colonel Giovanni Buitrago Beltrán, Commander of the Antioquia Department Police, “an elite body of the judicial police commission, in conjunction with the Office of the Attorney General, has been dispatched to carry out the corresponding investigation” (El Espectador, 2019).

Against this background, the Presidential Council for Stabilization and Consolidation launched a pilot program to protect Program participants. This program is rooted in coordination between local authorities and the Armed Forces, the Victims Protection Office, the Office of the Attorney General and the Ombudsman’s Office to develop protective measures to safeguard this vulnerable population.

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